<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">Having flunked on a detail Saturday, I will try to do better tonight.<div><br></div><div>This SODA is a possibility for improving Approval.</div><div><br></div><div>I remain a Condorcet backer:</div><div> . What it offers is valuable to voters seeing the value of ranking in voting.</div><div> . Approval voting is doable within Condorcet (and having full value within its capability) for those preferring to avoid actual ranking.<br><div><br><div><div>On Jun 6, 2011, at 2:51 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:</div><blockquote type="cite"><div class="gmail_quote">2011/6/6 <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:fsimmons@pcc.edu">fsimmons@pcc.edu</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"> <div class="im">----- Original Message -----<br> From: Jameson Quinn<br> </div><div class="im">> 2011/6/5 Dave Ketchum<br> ><br> </div><div><div></div><div class="h5">> > I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson<br> > calls SODA. It<br> > > gets a lot of thought here, including claimed Condorcet<br> > compliance. I offer<br> > > what I claim is a true summary of what I would call smart<br> > Approval. What I<br> > > see:<br> > > . Candidates each offer draft Approval votes which voters<br> > can know in<br> > > making their decisions.<br> > ><br> ><br> > You are close, but apparently Forest and I haven't explained the<br> > system well<br> > enough. Candidates offer full or truncated rankings of other<br> > candidates.<br> ><br> > > . Vote by Approval rules.<br> > > . If there is no winner, then each candidate gets to vote<br> > above draft<br> > > once for each ballot that bullet voted for that candidate.<br> > ></div></div></blockquote></div></blockquote>Exactly what the candidates may/shall do is a topic for later design. It starts with:</div><div> . Before the election the candidates define what voting they will do if lack of winner gives them the opportunity/duty.</div><div> . Voters know of these promises and either do Approval voting or do bullet voting to have the voted for candidate vote as promised.</div><div> . If no winner these extra votes hopefully will see to deciding on a winner.<blockquote type="cite"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><div><div class="h5"> ><br> > Candidates may vote any approval ballot consistent with the<br> > ranking above<br> > once for each ballot. They do so simultaneously, once, after the full<br> > results and all candidate's rankings have been published.<br> > "Consistent with"<br> > means that they simply set an approval cutoff - a lowest<br> > approved candidate<br> > - and all candidates above that in their ranking are approved.<br> ><br> > > . If a voter is thinking bullet voting, but wants to avoid<br> > the above -<br> > > voting also for an unreal write-in will avoid giving the<br> > candidate a draft<br> > > vote.<br> <br> </div></div>Instead of an "unreal write-in" it could be a virtual candidate whose name is<br> "No proxy for me" meaning "I do not delegate my approvals to any candidate."<br> <div><div></div><div class="h5">><br> > Yes.<br> ><br> > You've left out one extra check on this system, wherein the top<br> > two approval<br> > candidates are recounted in a virtual runoff without any "delegated<br> > approvals" between those two.><br> > ><br> > > I do not see the claimed compliance, for voters do not get to<br> > do ranking.</div></div></blockquote></div></blockquote>...</div></div></div></body></html>