[EM] Remember Toby

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/6/5 Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com>

> I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson calls SODA.  It
> gets a lot of thought here, including claimed Condorcet compliance.  I offer
> what I claim is a true summary of what I would call smart Approval.  What I
> see:
>     . Candidates each offer draft Approval votes which voters can know in
> making their decisions.
>

You are close, but apparently Forest and I haven't explained the system well
enough. Candidates offer full or truncated rankings of other candidates.


>     . Vote by Approval rules.
>     . If there is no winner, then each candidate gets to vote above draft
> once for each ballot that bullet voted for that candidate.
>

Candidates may vote any approval ballot consistent with the ranking above
once for each ballot. They do so simultaneously, once, after the full
results and all candidate's rankings have been published. "Consistent with"
means that they simply set an approval cutoff - a lowest approved candidate
- and all candidates above that in their ranking are approved.


>     . If a voter is thinking bullet voting, but wants to avoid the above -
> voting also for an unreal write-in will avoid  giving the candidate a draft
> vote.
>

Yes.

You've left out one extra check on this system, wherein the top two approval
candidates are recounted in a virtual runoff without any "delegated
approvals" between those two.


>
> I do not see the claimed compliance, for voters do not get to do ranking.
>  I see a couple uses of thoughts that imply ranking - they are so rare that
> they look like typos to me.
>

I'll give a formal proof showing in what sense and in what circumstances
this system is more compliant than Condorcet systems later this week, when I
have time to write it out. You are right that individual voters cannot do
ranking, and so if there's a significant constituency with a shared ranking
which is neither represented by a candidate nor balanced out by random
noise, then that constituency is faced with the strategic choices typical of
approval, and the system as a whole does not guarantee compliance. However,
if that is not true - that is, if the electorate can be characterized as a
set of known coherent candidate-led constituencies plus a leftover which is
exactly 50/50 on any candidate pair - then this system, unlike actual
Condorcet systems, is compliant, not just for honest votes, but always for
any rational strategic votes.



>
> On Jun 5, 2011, at 6:23 PM, fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:
> ...
>
>
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