[EM] Remember Toby

[Kathy Dopp]

Forest,

While I love the complement of "great idea", I still am not 100% sure
if the method is well-defined. I.e. under what condition do all the
Asset voters (the candidates) get to cast their 2nd choice votes for
the voters?  To be fair, wouldn't all candidates who received any
bullet votes have to be allowed to cast 2nd choice votes. But then,
wouldn't that be like voting against themselves?  Or doesn't Asset
voting have similar problems to IRV if only the losing candidates get
to reapportion their votes -- i.e. tending to elect extremist
candidates on the right or left and eliminating centrist majority
favorites because the 2nd choices of some voters (that they've
allocated to their 1st choice candidate) would be hidden during the
counting process?

Please try to unconfuse my thinking on this because I seem to be
convincing myself that simple Approval might be better.  How exactly
are you suggesting this AA method (for Asset Approval) work? Maybe
AA's too much like Alcoholic Anonymous ;-)

If it were me, I would probably only feel comfortable with AA if *all*
the candidates receiving bullet votes had their 2nd rank choice
counted in round 2 - regardless of whether or not it caused their own
loss or not. But that would mean if possibly allowing some candidates
to *not* list any 2nd choice and to bullet vote for themselves, so
that their bullet voters did not receive any asset votes. I'm I making
this too confusing?

Kathy

> From: fsimmons at pcc.edu
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Subject: [EM] Remember Toby
> Message-ID: <e1a0d07252dc0.4de9293c at pcc.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> Dear Kathy,
>
> Great idea!  Why didn't I think of that?  As you indicated, it could be done with an ordinary Plurality
> ballot, and would amount to a simplified version of DYN:
>
> If a voter "bullet" votes, then the ballot is interpreted as submission of a replicate of the Approval ballot
> that the marked candidate ends up submitting. Otherwise it is interpreted as an ordinary Approval ballot.
> The candidate with the most approval wins.
>
> To rule out the smoke-filled-room scenario, candidates' Approval ballots must be consistent with their
> rankings of the candidates, which they are required to publish at least a three (?) days before the voting
> takes place.
>
> This method is indeed uniformly better than Plurality, Asset, and Approval!
>
> What should we call it?
>
> Can anybody think of a better deterministic voting method for a single winner public proposal?
>
> Forest
>

-- 

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections
http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174

Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf

View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051