[EM] Remember Toby

[Dave Ketchum]

On Jun 1, 2011, at 3:57 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:
>> It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type
>> and ease of voting it than they are of the exact counting rules.
>> There are several Condorcet methods that are clone proof and
>> monotonic without being too complicated.

Let's start by narrowing the field:
      - Forget plurality - we offer that bullet voting suits many as  
in Approval.
      - Approval thinking is backed in Condorcet - voters simply pick  
any rank, and approve all desired at that rank.
      - Condorcet thinking with its ranking satisfies the above and  
many others - usually by identifying a CW.  Cycles inspire debate but  
are basically selecting one member from among the cycle leaders  
according to method details.
      - Others, such as range and asset, require additional work by  
voters and counters.
>
>
> Perhaps, but not to the extent that Schulze has passed yet, if  
> complexity is the reason we don't have Schulze yet (or why Toby  
> failed). Thus I was trying to find very simple rules that would do  
> reasonably well, and I think you could do worse than Copeland with  
> simple tiebreaker.
>
> As far as complexity is concerned, I'd rank them in about this order:
>
> 1. Approval, plurality
> 2. Range
> (some distance here because of the unfamiliarity of the Condorcet  
> treatment in general)
> 3. Copeland
> 4. Minmax
> 5. Ranked Pairs
> (quite some distance)
> 6. Schulze (although the CSSD phrasing may make it seem simpler)
> (quite a lot more)
> 7. DAC/DSC and other very complex rules.
>
> Your chain-based and uncovered methods would be somewhere between  
> Copeland and Schulze. I'm not sure exactly where, because I don't  
> know whether they feel unfamiliar because I'm not used to them, or  
> because the electorate wouldn't be.
>
> I'm not sure where Borda-elimination would be, either. Borda would  
> probably be between Range and Copeland, but Borda isn't any good as  
> a method because of its extreme susceptibility to teaming and  
> tactical voting.
>
>> I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there is one, else elect the
>> candidate ranked (or ranked above last) on the greatest number of   
>> ballots" is plenty simple, and is much
>> more satisfactory than MinMax or Copeland in other respects.
>
> True enough. I'd probably prefer it to be Smith, though, and I hope  
> the voters wouldn't feel penalized for giving the rank all the way  
> down to the last candidate. If someone were to reason "Even though I  
> don't like these guys, I'd rather have this one than that one", it  
> would be bad if the ballot interpreted this to say that they  
> approved of every candidate.

Voting that they approve should be read as such - they should not vote  
it unless they mean it.  The method and the teaching should agree on  
this.
>
>> But, as I said, what we really need to concentrate on is simplicity
>> in votinig, i.e. how do we make ballots that easy to use for "Hodge,
>> fresh from the plough," as Lewis Carroll put it.
>> It has been averred many times on this list that in Australia, where
>> partial rankings are considered spoiled ballots, the vast majority of
>> voters fill out their ballots by copying "candidate cards" which are
>> published  sample ballots recommended by the various candidates.
>
> Forcing full rank is bad, you'll get no disagreement from me there.  
> I do think the EM style ballot is simple enough, though: rank as  
> many as you want, and if you feel like it, make use of equal-rank,  
> too. Although the equal-rank part hasn't to my knowledge been used  
> elsewhere, the rest seems to work where it has been used. Earlier, I  
> gave examples of STV use in the US, and STV is also used elsewhere  
> in the world without voters really complaining about the complexity  
> of the ballot.

Agreed forcing full ranking is bad, while ranking implies approval.
      - Equal ranking needs permitting since it often agrees with  
voter thoughts.
      - Write-ins should be accepted, though there are two groups:
           - Rare stray votes, which deserve no attention.
           - Serious attempts to elect without having formally  
nominated.  Painful counting, but need counting when this happens.

How many different rank numbers?
      - Perhaps at least three to accommodate voter desires.
      - Perhaps not more than three to minimize use of ballot space.

>> Asset voting makes this automatic for 100% of the voters.  That's
>> probably going too far, so how do we get a compromise between Asset
>> voting and Condorcet?
>
> Approval Asset, perhaps? But I'd prefer the power to stay with the  
> voters as much as possible. If we have representative democracy  
> because the people can't make every decision themselves, then one  
> should move away from the ideal (direct) democracy as little as is  
> required.