[EM] Remember Toby (fsimmons at pcc.edu)

[Kathy Dopp]

I agree with everything you've said here re. simplicity etc.

Condorcet with Approval to break Condorcet cycles would be great.
Simple to explain, precinct-summable with the use of an NxN matrix,
with N= # candidates and the matrix diagonal available for other data.
(such as the total number of ballots cast or ?)

I like the idea of using Approval to count all except the last ballot
position, whatever that would be. In the US, given current voting
system capacities, that would be counting the first two ranked
positions.

Upper margin error bounds could probably be calculated for each
reported Condorcet matrix precinct tally so that selection weights and
sample sizes could be calculated for post-election manual audits to
publicly verify the accuracy of the reported election outcomes.

Range voting would be too complex because it involves too much thought
and strategizing for voters to determine how many relative points to
give each candidate. Some of the other methods for resolving Condorcet
cycles are too complex for most voters to understand and apply so that
they can check the calculations.  IRV and STV methods are out, not
only due to their nonmonotonicity, and their failure to solve the
spoiler problem, but due to their fundamental unfair method of
counting ballots which makes manual counting and thus auditing for
election outcome accuracy virtually impossible.

We ought to focus on how to make Condorcet/Approval voting
understandable to the public and to election officials and show how it
could be used with existing voting equipment, the existing problems
with plurality it solves, etc.  I could work on developing the
mathematics of post-election auditing sampling for it when I have
time.

Kathy

> Date: Wed, 01 Jun 2011 02:46:20 +0000 (GMT)
> From: fsimmons at pcc.edu

> It seems to me that thevoters are more worried about the ballot type and ease of voting it than they are
> of the exact counting rules.   There are several Condorcet methods that are clone proof and monotonic
> without being too complicated.  I agree with Kevin that "elect the CW if there is one, else elect the
> candidate ranked (or ranked above last) on the greatest number of ballots" is plenty simple, and is much
> more satisfactory than MinMax or Copeland in other respects.
>
> But, as I said, what we really need to concentrate on is simplicity in votinig, i.e. how do we make ballots
> that easy to use for "Hodge, fresh from the plough," as Lewis Carroll put it.
>
> It has been averred many times on this list that in Australia, where partial rankings are considered
> spoiled ballots, the vast majority of voters fill out their ballots by copying "candidate cards" which are
> published  sample ballots recommended by the various candidates.
>
> Asset voting makes this automatic for 100% of the voters.  That's probably going too far, so how do we
> get a compromise between Asset voting and Condorcet?
>
>

-- 

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections
http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174

Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf

View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051