[EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA

[Jameson Quinn]

Perhaps I should start by asking you to explain amalgamation. I have an idea
of what you mean, but you didn't explain it in the initial post of this
thread, and I don't want to write a detailed analysis based on a
possibly-wrong supposition.

JQ

2011/7/31 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

> Jameson,
>
> for my benefit could you elaborate on what you mean by hijacking strategy,
> especially in the context of
> amalgamation of factions.
>
> Is ordinary Range susceptible to hijacking?  If not, then neither is
> amalgamation of factions per se, since
> Range scores are identical with or without amalgamation of factions.
>
> Forest
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Jameson Quinn
> Date: Saturday, July 30, 2011 4:35 pm
> Subject: Re: [EM] A DSV method inspired by SODA
> To: fsimmons at pcc.edu
> Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>
> > 2011/7/30
> >
> > > One of the features of SODA is a step where the candidates
> > decide what
> > > their approval cutoffs will be.on
> > > behalf of themselves and the voters for whom they are acting
> > as proxies.
> > > One of the many novel features
> > > is that instead of making these decisions simultaneously, the
> > candidates> make them sequentially with
> > > full knowledge of the decisions of the candidates preceding
> > them in the
> > > sequence.
> > >
> > > I wonder if anybody has ever tried a DSV (designated strategy
> > voting)> method based on these ideas.
> > >
> > > Here's one way it could go:
> > >
> > > Voters submit range ballots.
> > >
> > > Factions are amalgamated via weighted averages, so that each
> > candidate ends
> > > up with one faction that
> > > counts according to its total weight. For large electorates,
> > these faction
> > > scores will almost surely yield
> > > complete rankings of the candidates.
> > >
> > > From this point on, only these rankings will be used. The
> > ratings were
> > > only needed for the purpose of
> > > amalgamating the factions. If we had started with rankings,
> > we could have
> > > converted them to ratings via
> > > the method of my recent post under the subject "Borda Done
> > Right." In
> > > either case, once we have the
> > > rankings from the amalgamated factions we proceed as follows:
> > >
> > > Based on these rankings the DSC (descending solid coalitions)
> > winner D is
> > > found. The D faction ranking
> > > determines the sequential order of play. When it is candidate
> > X's turn in
> > > the order of play, X's approval
> > > cutoff decision is made automatically as follows:
> > >
> > > For each of the possible cutoffs, the winner is determined
> > recursively (by
> > > running through the rest of the
> > > DSV tentatively). The cutoff that yields the best (i.e.
> > highest ranked)
> > > candidate according to X's faction's
> > > ranking, is the cutoff that is applied to X's faction.
> > >
> > > After all of the cutoffs have been applied, the approval
> > winner (based on
> > > those cutoffs) is elected.
> > >
> > > It would be too good to be true if this method turned out to
> > be monotone.
> > > For that to be true moving up
> > > one position in the sequence of play could not hurt the
> > winner. Although I
> > > think that this is probably
> > > usually true, I don't think that it is always true. Anybody
> > know any
> > > different?
> > >
> >
> >
> > I'm pretty certain that even if a method like this could be
> > monotone, the
> > amalgamation in the first step breaks it, because of a
> > "candidate hijacking"
> > strategy.
> >
> > I have no opinion if some other way to do this step would give
> > monotonicity.I'd like to think so, but I wouldn't bet on it.
> >
> > JQ
> >
> > > ----
> > > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
> > for list info
> > >
> >
>
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