[EM] PR for USA or UK

[Jameson Quinn]

>  I don't necessarily think sophisticated voters are required in order to
> ensure reasonable PR under PRV. I think as long as you don't get some
> candidates who have much better strategic voters than others, it should do
> OK.
>

You should read some of Schulze's papers about the history of free riding.
It seems clear from those examples that there are examples of parties with
better or worse free-riding vote-management capabilities. So I would worry
about this distorting results.


>  Separate constituencies do spoil proportionality to an extent, yes. There
> would only be a certain number of seats available in each. If it was six,
> then a party with constant 10% support across the county would struggle to
> get anything. What's the alternative? We could have bigger constituencies,
> but that means bigger ballots, or party lists, but I don't like them. I'm
> not sure I get your district/co-district thing though. In any case, I think
> this is a problem of how we sort out districts/constituencies, rather than
> anything against PRV per se.
>
> Also, I don't get the whole thing about write-ins. Maybe it's a UK/US
> divide thing, but surely if you want to be elected then you stand for
> election. Therefore your name would be on the ballot.
>

US elections typically have space for write-ins, and occasionally a
candidate who did not make it onto the ballot (most frequently, because they
lost a party primary; but sometimes for other reasons) will mount a "write
in campaign". The current governor of Alaska is one such, I think; or is it
senator?

But in SODA-PR, the "districts", "co-districts", and "write-ins" are merely
a way to avoid ballot clutter. If there are 40 seats being elected at once,
that could easily lead to close to 100 candidates. By only listing the
same-district candidates on the ballot, voters are encouraged to focus on
the few candidates near them. Voters who want more choice can look down to
the candidates from the 1 or 2 "co-districts". And voters who want all the
choices would have to research the candidates beforehand and write-in their
names. It is purely a matter of ballot design; but it would reassure
existing single-district winners that they would still have a "constituency"
under the new system.

JQ



>
>
>  ------------------------------
>  *From:* Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
> *To:* election-methods at electorama.com
> *Sent:* Sun, 24 July, 2011 5:38:18
> *Subject:* Re: [EM] PR for USA or UK
>
> >Hi Toby,
>
> Hello.
>
> >I really don't know what "dishonest results" means. Judging by your
> >example below it apparently requires comparing two different methods.
> >So, I can make any method give "dishonest results" just by inventing
> >a different method that requires dishonesty from everyone. Now every
> >other method in the world is cheating.
>
> I suppose what I mean is that by transferrig your vote for you, STV ends up
> producing the same result (in my simple case) as PRV with strategic voting,
> and to me it's an ugly result.
>
> >It's not a bad description that strategy-resistant systems "do the
> >strategy for you." This has important results:
>
> >1. The voters do not need to do the strategy
> >2. So the playing field is leveled
> >3. So votes should have correct effect in proportion to the number,
> >meaning the outcome is more accurate. That is, it reflects better the
> >overall preferences of the electorate.
>
> Strategy-resistant systems do have certain advantages as you say, but in
> the single-winner case it would end up reducing range to a Condorcet method,
> which arguably isn't as good, and ends up pushing out a "better-liked"
> candidate for one that strictly more people prefer. And this is what I like
> about range - it's not just about which candidates you prefer to which other
> ones, but by how much. And as long as strategy isn't performed better by
> voters of some candidates than others, the fact that there would still be
> some honest voters would mean that the advantages of range would still
> remain to an extent, meaning that overall better-liked candidates stand a
> better chance, and it therefore reflects better the overall preferences of
> the electorate!
>
> >>On my website I give an example where party A has 68% of the support
> >>and party B 32%. There are two seats and so each party fields two
> >>candidates. Assuming everyone would vote approval style, under my
> >>system, they would win one each. Party A would need over 75% of the
> >>votes to win the second seat. I would argue that this is a fair result
> >>(75% being bang in the middle between 50% and 100% - the amount to
> >>exactly earn one and two seats).
>
> >How is 50% the amount to get one seat?
>
> I mean that it's the exact proportional amount without any rounding. One
> seat = 50% of two seats. That's all I meant. Also 0% is the exact
> proportional amount for zero seats and 100% is the exact amount for two
> seats, so they have a linear relationship. So it's not too much of a stretch
> to say that 75% = 1.5 seats and a reasonable cut-off.
>
>
> >> Of course party A voters could
> >>coordinate themselves and split into two factions of 34% to take both
> >>seats, but this would be very hard for them to achieve. STV (Droop
> >>quota anyway) would transfer the votes above the quota accordingly
> >>so that party A would win both seats, and give what I would regard
> >>as the less fair result.
>
> >Ok, but it's not obvious that it is less fair. You are according a
> >privilege to the weaker party just because it is a different party.
>
> I'm not according them a privilege because they are a different party, but
> because I would see it as logical and fair that 75% is a reasonable cut-off.
> If a system made the cut-off at 80%, I'd argue that it was unfair in favour
> of the smaller party.
>
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