[EM] Has this idea been considered?

[Russ Paielli]

Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized
that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar
to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I
consider a major defect.

OK, here's another proposal. Same thing I proposed at the top of this
thread, except that voters can vote for more than one candidate, as in
Approval Voting. How does that stack up?

By the way, I took a look at SODA, and I must tell you that I don't consider
it a "practical reform proposal." It's way too complicated to ever be
adopted for major public elections. The method I just proposed is already
pushing the limit for complexity, and it is much simpler than SODA.

Regards,
Russ P.


On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:

> A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a
> majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that
> Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd
> disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects
> of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal, SODA<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA>,
> is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real
> hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here.
>
> With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off.
> First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV,
> because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads
> inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way
> that can clearly be criticized as "spoiled" (the centrist would have won
> pairwise) and "nonmonotonic" (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to
> lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not
> transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage
> compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early,
> and their votes transferred more than once before the final result.
>
> Cheers,
> Jameson
>
> 2011/7/4 Russ Paielli <russ.paielli at gmail.com>
>
>> Hello,
>>
>> I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years
>> ago. How is everyone doing?
>>
>> I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a
>> good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if
>> so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works:
>>
>> The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the
>> US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are
>> counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the
>> candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the
>> same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority.
>>
>> The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as
>> follows. Weeks before the election, each candidate constructs a ranked list
>> of his or her preferences for the other candidates. The resulting preference
>> matrix could (should?) be published for the voters to see in advance. The
>> bottom candidate at each round of transfers would then have his or her votes
>> automatically transferred to the top remaining candidate in his or her
>> preference list.
>>
>> The transfer of votes from the bottom finisher in each round resembles
>> IRV, but note that this method is "summable" -- a major advantage over IRV,
>> eliminating the need to maintain a record of each and every vote cast. I
>> think it may also have other major strategy-deterring advantages over IRV.
>> What do you think? Thanks.
>>
>> Russ P.
>>
>> --
>> http://RussP.us
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>>
>


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