Thanks for the feedback, Jameson. After thinking about it a bit, I realized that the method I proposed probably suffers from strategy problems similar to IRV. But at least it avoids the summability problem of IRV, which I consider a major defect.<br>
<br>OK, here's another proposal. Same thing I proposed at the top of this thread, except that voters can vote for more than one candidate, as in Approval Voting. How does that stack up?<br><br>By the way, I took a look at SODA, and I must tell you that I don't consider it a "practical reform proposal." It's way too complicated to ever be adopted for major public elections. The method I just proposed is already pushing the limit for complexity, and it is much simpler than SODA.<br>
<br>Regards,<br>Russ P.<br><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 1:10 PM, Jameson Quinn <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com">jameson.quinn@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;">
<span></span><span></span><a></a>A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal, <a href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA" target="_blank">SODA</a>, is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here.<div>
<br></div><div>With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off. First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV, because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way that can clearly be criticized as "spoiled" (the centrist would have won pairwise) and "nonmonotonic" (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early, and their votes transferred more than once before the final result.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Cheers, </div><div>Jameson</div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div><div></div><div class="h5">2011/7/4 Russ Paielli <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:russ.paielli@gmail.com" target="_blank">russ.paielli@gmail.com</a>></span><br>
</div></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); padding-left: 1ex;"><div><div></div><div class="h5">
Hello,<br><br>I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years ago. How is everyone doing?<br><br>I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works:<br>
<br>The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority.<br>
<br>The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as follows. Weeks before the election, each candidate constructs a ranked list of his or her preferences for the other candidates. The resulting preference matrix could (should?) be published for the voters to see in advance. The bottom candidate at each round of transfers would then have his or her votes automatically transferred to the top remaining candidate in his or her preference list.<br clear="all">
<br>
The transfer of votes from the bottom finisher in each round resembles
IRV, but note that this method is "summable" -- a major advantage over
IRV, eliminating the need to maintain a record of each and every vote cast. I
think it may also have other major strategy-deterring advantages over IRV. What do you think? Thanks.<br><br>Russ P.<br><font color="#888888">
<br>-- <br><a href="http://RussP.us" target="_blank">http://RussP.us</a><br><br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br></div>
</blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><br>-- <br><a href="http://RussP.us">http://RussP.us</a><br>