[EM] Has this idea been considered?

[Jameson Quinn]

A system based purely on candidates freely transferring their votes until a
majority (or Droop quota) is reached is called Asset voting. I believe that
Asset voting is a good system, though there are certainly those who'd
disagree. It is also possible - and I'd say desirable - to combine aspects
of Asset with other systems productively. One such proposal,
SODA<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA>,
is currently my favorite practical reform proposal, something I have real
hopes for. So I'd certainly say you have (reinvented) some good ideas here.

With that said, I can see a couple of problems with this system right off.
First off, bottom-up elimination is probably the worst feature of IRV,
because there is a fairly broad range of situations where it leads
inevitably to eliminating a centrist and electing an extremist, in a way
that can clearly be criticized as "spoiled" (the centrist would have won
pairwise) and "nonmonotonic" (votes shifting to the winner can cause them to
lose). Secondly, a voter has no power to ensure that their vote is not
transferred in a way they do not approve of. This second disadvantage
compounds with the first, because a minority bloc will be eliminated early,
and their votes transferred more than once before the final result.

Cheers,
Jameson

2011/7/4 Russ Paielli <russ.paielli at gmail.com>

> Hello,
>
> I was somewhat active on this mailing list for a short time several years
> ago. How is everyone doing?
>
> I have an idea for a single-winner election method, and it seems like a
> good one to me. I'd like to know if it has been considered before and, if
> so, what the problems are with it, if any. Here's how it works:
>
> The mechanics of casting a ballot are identical to what we do now (in the
> US anyway). Each voter simply votes for one candidate. After the votes are
> counted, the last-place candidate transfers his or her votes to the
> candidate of his or her choice. Then the next-to-last candidate does the
> same thing, and so on, until one candidate has a majority.
>
> The transfer of votes at the close of polling could be automated as
> follows. Weeks before the election, each candidate constructs a ranked list
> of his or her preferences for the other candidates. The resulting preference
> matrix could (should?) be published for the voters to see in advance. The
> bottom candidate at each round of transfers would then have his or her votes
> automatically transferred to the top remaining candidate in his or her
> preference list.
>
> The transfer of votes from the bottom finisher in each round resembles IRV,
> but note that this method is "summable" -- a major advantage over IRV,
> eliminating the need to maintain a record of each and every vote cast. I
> think it may also have other major strategy-deterring advantages over IRV.
> What do you think? Thanks.
>
> Russ P.
>
> --
> http://RussP.us
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
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