[EM] PR-SODA? Try 2 (and 3)

[Andy Jennings]

On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 9:45 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:

> So, here's the simpler procedure:
>
> While there are more uneliminated candidates than empty seats:
>
> Divide each ballot by the number of uneliminated candidates it approves
> If there are any candidates with more than a Droop quota:
>
> Elect the one with the highest score (previously "unique ballots")
> Discard a Droop quota of randomly-chosen ballots which approve the elected
> candidate, starting with the ones delegated to that candidate
> Assign that candidates pre-declared approvals on any undiscarded delegated
> ballots for that candidate
>
> Otherwise:
>
> Eliminate the candidate with the lowest score
> Assign that candidates pre-declared approvals on any delegated ballots for
> that candidate
>
> Elect all remaining candidates to fill the seats.



Okay, I really love how simple this is.  From the description, it sounds
like it would be explainable and would work well.  I wonder how it does in
simulations and if we can find any problematic scenarios.

Questions:
- Is there a "bullet vote but don't delegate" option like normal SODA?

- Would it work just as well with the Hare quota?

- Without the delegation, is it the same as any other
PR-with-approval-ballots method in existence?

Suggestions:
- When a candidate is elected and you need to discard ballots, you could
specify a more detailed preference order:
1. Ballots which delegated to that candidate
2. Ballots which bullet voted that candidate and didn't delegate
3. Ballots which approved two candidates
4. Ballots which approved three candidates
5. Ballots which approved four candidates
6. And so on.
This eliminates ballots first which approve fewer candidates.  You may still
have to select randomly within these tiers, but it gives an incentive for
people to approve more candidates, which helps the method work better.
 Right?


- Andy
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