[EM] An interesting real election

[Paul Kislanko]

How is #1 not a Condorcet Winner, since #1 pairwise-beats every other
alternative?

  _____  

From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Andrew
Myers
Sent: Saturday, January 29, 2011 4:41 PM
To: Election Methods Mailing List
Subject: [EM] An interesting real election


Here is an unusual case from a real poll run recently by a group using CIVS.
Usually there is a Condorcet winner, but not this time. Who should win?

Ranked pairs says #1, and ranks the six choices as shown. It only has to
reverse one preference. Schulze says #2, because it beats #6 by 15-11, and
#6 beats #1 by 14-13. So #2 has a 14-13 beatpath vs. #1. Hill's method
("Condorcet-IRV") picks #6 as the winner.

-- Andrew


 	  	 1.	 2.	 3.	 4.	 5.	 6.	
1. 
	 	 -	 13	 15	 17	 16	 13	
2. 
	 	 9	 -	 13	 14	 17	 15	
3.	  	 11	 11	 -	 13	 15	 14	
4. 
	 	 9	 10	 10	 -	 14	 13	
5. 
	 	 11	 10	 9	 10	 -	 13	
6. 
	 	 14	 11	 11	 13	 10	 -	
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