[EM] Trying to out-do... a result!

[Kevin Venzke]

Alright, I have had a stab at this burial-resistant Condorcet method.

Here is the rule. It's really meant for three candidates, but you could
try with more.

1. If there is a Condorcet winner, elect him.
2. (optional) eliminate Smith or Schwartz losers. Transfer or don't 
transfer preferences due to this. If ballots are exhausted, redetermine
or don't redetermine the meaning of majority/50%.
3. Label remaining candidates A,B,C in descending order of first-
preferences.
4. If B has a majority pairwise win over A, elect B. (Alternative: Don't
require a majority win.)
5. If A has a >50% pairwise win over B, elect A. (The 50% is required
here.)
6. If A does not have a >50% loss to C, elect A. (Alternative: Don't
require a majority loss, just say any loss. You could even delete this
rule completely.)
7. Otherwise elect C.

There may be a more sophisticated way to identify A/B/C for the case of
more than four Smith candidates, but I don't have it currently.

Some observations:
1. A voters can affect the B:C contest, but there is no reason because
that contest is unimportant.
2. B voters can affect the A:C contest, but if that contest is regarded
it means B already lost.
3. C voters can affect the A:B contest, but they are seeking an indecisive
(sub-majority) outcome, otherwise C loses.

Other vulnerabilities may exist of course... B voters in theory can vote
sincerely, but if they suspect that C voters will truncate B, hoping to
win using B>C votes, the B voters may be reluctant to aid C.

Kevin