[EM] new working paper: "Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid methods for single-winner elections"

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Kristofer,

--- En date de : Sam 19.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no> a écrit :
> Some other observations: it seems that adding a Smith
> constraint (Smith, or Smith//) limits the vulnerability to
> compromising, and that having the base method satisfy LNHarm
> greatly limits vulnerability to burial, since the base
> method is then immune to burial.

Well actually it's LNHelp that gives you immunity to burial. (DSC, QR, and
MMPO are vulnerable in varying ways.) And sadly it seems to me that the 
desirability of having other voters doubt that you will express a certain
lower preference, mitigates the advantage of LNHarm.

If you look at LNHelp instead you will probably start out with 
Condorcet//Approval, which actually is one of my favorite methods due to
anti-burial properties. Maybe DAC is of interest too.

Kevin