[EM] Methods based on faction-size or hypothetical cooperation or noncooperation

[Jameson Quinn]

How can you continue to ignore delegation and sequential assignment (as in
SODA) as an FBC-compliant solution to ABE/chicken dilemma? SODA isn't even
optimized for this; if for some reason you're unsatisfied with the slight
remnants of the chicken dilemma which SODA leaves, you could (at the cost
of either complexity or voter freedom) make a system which solves the
dilemma 100% instead of just 99.9%.

Jameson

2011/12/27 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>

>  Because of the great desirability of avoiding the ABE problem, it's worth
> considering or looking at
> all sorts of possible solutions.
>
> MMPO and MDDTR are known to work fine, though they have vulnerability to
> non-valid criticisms.
>
> The mutuality-requiring methods work fine too, and, though someone here
> has made angry noises about them,
> he isn't saying anything other than personal opinion, and would be
> unlikely to be able to make a public case
> against the mutuality-requiring methods.
>
> Nevertheless, it's always useful to consider other approaches.
>
> I'd spoken of two approaches to avoiding ABE:
>
> 1. Counting combined support (even if one-sided) against a candidate.
>
> 2. Mutuality-requirement
>
> And now,
>
> 3. Faction-size (as a ballot option)
>
> 4. Hypothetical cooperation or noncooperation
>
> How they'd work:
>
> 3. Faction-size (as a ballot option):
>
> In the kind of ABE situation we've been speaking of, the problem would be
> solved
> if the A voters could indicate on their ballot that their middle-rating
> for B is
> conditional upon B having at least as many top-ratings as A has.
>
> Of course sometimes it's necessary to support a compromise with less
> favoriteness,
> and so this requirement should be optional.
>
> 4. Hypothetical cooperation or noncooperation:
>
> This could be automatic or optional.
>
> There could be a rule that, ballot1's  middle rating to a candidate2 who
> isn't in
> a mutual approval set in common with any of ballot1's top-rated candidates
> is counted
> only if that candidate2 would outpoll each of ballot1's top-rated
> candidates if, for each
> candidate1 on ballot 1:
>
> ...no ballot top-rating candidate2 and not candidate1 gives a
> middle-rating to candidate1
> and no ballot top-rating candidate1 and not candidate2 gives a
> middle-rating to candidate2.
>
> [end of tentative, work-in-progress, maybe-useful definition of the
> hypothetical noncooperation approach]
>
> Alternatively, that last paragraph could replace "no ballot" with "every
> ballot". That would be
> the hypothetical cooperation approach, which probably amounts to the same
> thing.
>
> The above could be applied to all the middle-ratings, based on an initial
> assumption that
> all middle ratings are counted. Of course, the application of the above
> requirements
> would likely change the conditions that had caused some middle ratings to
> be given or
> with-held. It would be simplest to disregard that change. To have the
> system re-examine the
> noncounting of middle-ratings, and re-apply its requirement, could result
> in an unstable
> outcome that changes with each re-examination.
>
> Just using an initial assumption that all middle ratings are counted might
> be adequate for
> avoiding the ABE problem. It certainly is, in the simple ABE situation
> that's been discussed
> here.
>
> ----------------------------
>
> I'm not saying that these ABE approaches are as workable or desirable as
> approaches #1 and #2. But,
> as I said, all possibilities are worth naming, due to the importance of
> avoiding the co-operation/
> defection problem. Approach #3 seems simple and workable, and useful for
> situations like the
> usual ABE.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
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