[EM] Re et al Chicken and Egg

[David L Wetzell]

Me playing the sucker for punishment yet again with Kristofer...,

KM:You still haven't given me any numbers. If we're going to resolve
anything, we'd have to find some kind of agreement as to what data would be
accepted.

dlw: Case studies.  I'd like lots of case studies.
There are (at least) three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and voter
utilities...  I distrust rational choice models.  I do not expect hard
numbers for Xs and find analytical args over which rule has the biggest X
to be circuitous and not fruitful for raising the P of some lucky election
rule...

KM: Say, for instance, that I run the Bayesian regret calculations, and
that I decide to limit myself to four candidates (even though I think there
should be more), so that you can't dispute that aspect. Say, further, that
I get a result that the best Condorcet rule improves upon IRV about 10% as
much as IRV improves upon Plurality. Then you could easily say "see,
Condorcet isn't worth it". On the other hand, if I got a result that the
best Condorcet rule improves upon IRV 10x as much as IRV improves upon
Plurality, then you could also claim "yeah, but that's a static simulated
result under conditions that aren't realistic, so in reality X_other -
X_irv is still small".

dlw: I'd say it'd be impressive regardless, but I get your point...

I would then add:
I think 4 candidates is more realistic, given the tacit equitable
distributional assumptions used to generate the lies, uhr voter preferences
used for Bayesian Regret calculations.
I also think that the X of Condorcet would be lowered more than the X or
IRV by the bounded rationality of voter, since there'd be more GI and more
GO and it makes sense that the top ranking would have more signal and less
noise for many voters.
Furthermore, the hybridization of IRV and Approval Voting would raise the
BR and lower the gap...BR analysis has shown IRV to do its best relatively
when there are only 3 candidates and that is the context in which the
hybrid would use IRV.

Just as I think it's safe to say that the X of Approval and Score Voting
would be lowered more by relaxing the cardinal utility assumption implicit
in most Bayesian Regret calculations.  Let Xij be the initial cardinal
utility of voter i for candidate j.  Let Si be generated from a
log-standard normal distribution.  Let all the Xijs be transformed to
become Yij=(10^(1-Si) * Xij^Si).    Then, decide who to vote for based on
the Yijs, while assessing the results based on the Xijs.

The bottom line: Bayesian Regret is a heuristic and hence the proofs gotta
be in the pudding.

KM: After the fact, it would be simple for either of us to readjust the
rules of the game, as it were, so that we get off free. If the Bayesian
regret heuristic is going to solve anything, it must have power, and it
doesn't have power if we can just step around the result no matter what it
might be.

dlw: It's one of those fuzzy things that can be persuasive without being
defnitive in my book.  My views on election reform have been changed from
my debates with Dale Sheldon Hess and also Broken Ladder/Clay Shentrup).
 I'm more open to other election rules than IRV in the long run because of
their work.  But as you know, in the long run, we're all dead...

KM:I suppose, then, that what I'm really saying is this: you discard
theoretical points by saying theory isn't practice,

dlw: I don't discard or disregard theoretical points, I express diffidence
towards theoretical points, based on an ethos that's somewhere between a
"critical realism" and "instrumentalism" that I learned in my studies of
institutional economics.

KM: that you're middle-brow so it doesn't matter anyway,

dlw: Since as a middle-brow, I believe theory is essentially a crutch for
coping with a complicated, messy reality, not a precision laser for
pinpointing the right election rule.

KM: and even *if* they showed the other rules are better, they don't show
the other rules are *that much* better. You discard what little practical
(experimental) data we have by saying that it's inapplicable (AU) or that
the conclusion was just because of interference from scheming Plurality
advocates (Burlington).

dlw: Micronumerosity sucks.  As also does the problem of historical
specificity<http://www.google.com/search?sclient=psy-ab&hl=en&source=hp&q=historical+specificity+social+science+hodgson&pbx=1&oq=historical+specificity+social+science+hodgson&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&gs_sm=e&gs_upl=21738l23220l1l23582l8l8l0l0l0l0l282l1472l0.3.4l7l0&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.,cf.osb&biw=1490&bih=1000&ech=1&psi=IbHzTpvgKYvgggf1tYz_AQ.1324593440350.5&emsg=NCSR&noj=1&ei=MbHzTvu4EYfxgges-9ijAg>.
 That these problems are relevant to the matter at hand is not a matter of
opinion, in my opinion.

KM: At that point, very little remains. Thus I ask: what would it take to
change your mind? What demonstration, what experiment would give you the
data needed? What sort of argument would meet your "middle-brow, true test
of IRV" standards? If your answer is "nothing", then we're done and this is
just text on a screen.

dlw: Push for multi-winner elections in the US.  Trust that third parties
will enable an expansion of electoral experimentation, facilitated by smart
electoral analysts like the many people on this list, to break the impasse.

Recognize that in lieu of convincing empirical data over the Xs of
electoral alternatives, it's logical to focus more on the Ps in the short
run and strategically support IRV, or decline to strongly critique IRV, as
a clear improvement over FPTP for the US's two-party dominated system that
can be marketed to the US public.

KM: (Incidentally, I didn't see you reply to the 36% backsliding rate for
IRV. Were all of those due to scheming Plurality advocates?)

dlw: As with the Alternative Vote in UK, when the third party benefactor of
an electoral reform loses popularity, it makes the election rule less
popular.  If only we could assess election rules while wearing Rawlsian
masks that make us abstract from whether they'd help our self-interests in
the short-run...

KM:Only if STV pushes harder than IRV pulls. It doesn't in Australia.
>> You disclaim Australia because you say the data can't be generalized,
>> and you consider repeals of IRV to be merely victories by Plurality
>> advocates won by incomplete or flawed presentation, whereas incomplete
>> presentation in the other direction is simply "marketing" and thus
>> nothing to be concerned about.
>>
>
> dlw: AU uses IRV in "More local" elections where it is less likely to
> help due to de facto segregation by characteristics correlated with
> political preferences.  It uses PR in "less local" elections where it is
> less needed.  And so yes, it's not generalizable. I consider IRV to be
> reliable improvement on FPTP and two-round elections, moreso when
> coupled with the strategic use of PR that takes the edge off of how IRV
> does not tend to end effective 2-party domination.
>

KM: Would IRV + PR be better than Plurality + PR? If you've constructed all
of this from the Illinois example, which did use Plurality, why IRV? Or is
IRV just an expedient, something one has to swallow to get the whole
FairVote package, PR and all, through?

dlw: I support FairVote as the de facto leader of election reform in the
US.  They deserve that status for their spade work on communicating
election reform concepts to US voters ignorant of the electoral debate.
 But yes, I believe IRV+PR > FPP+PR >> FPP.  At issue is how much better, I
don't know.  I have been critical of FairVote in the past because they
seemed to put too much of their political capital on IRV, as still is the
case with the independent FairVoteMN in my home-state.  I am glad that's
going to change for FairVote.  I want to do whatever I can to get that ball
rolling in my country, including spending time on this list-serve arguing
that such is more important than trying to replace IRV with another
election rule.

> KM: So, in summary: I don't trust that IRV will give the necessary
>> changes. You do. We can keep on stating our claims backed by those
>> positions, but as long as we disagree on a more fundamental level, those
>> claims won't do anything but highlight our own positions yet again.
>>
>
> dlw: I recommend that you not push for the use of IRV in Norway.  I also
> hope that you and others do not stymie the coupling of IRV(hopefully in
> hybrid form) + Am. Forms of PR that is emerging as what
> progressives/centrists/**activists are going to be rallying around in the
> US.  When smart people like you and others here state unequivocally that
> Xoth>>Xirv it lowers Pirv without increasing Poth.
>

KM: I hope that the momentum (to what degree it exists) can be turned in
the right direction. Condorcet methods are being used in organizations (as
well as a political party) right now. The United Nations uses Approval.

dlw: In orgs with fewer better informed voters and more serious options,
condorcet methods would be clearly superior to IRV.  Likewise with umpteen
variations of proposals on the docket in the UN, Approval likely would be
better than IRV.  The trend is for experimentation away from FPTP.

KM: Furthermore, I would not say that my statements that X_other >> X_irv
"lowers" P_irv as much as that it brings P_irv in line with its true value,
should it persist. That is, I think IRV has several unappetizing properties
that, when discovered, will have people leave it; and it's better they see
those aspects now than later, so that they don't pull so much of the
general idea of electoral reform down with them when they *do* see the bad
parts of IRV.

dlw: Tell that to the nearly 50% of Burlington VT voters who wanted to keep
IRV.  P_irv is a short-run concept.  I don't care what it's true value is
in the long run, after all, I'm middle-brow on such things...

KM: True, claiming that X_other >> X_irv might not do much to P_other,
except perhaps by making it less likely that IRV's flaws will taint the
other methods. Raising P_other is a separate concern. It can be done by
people signing the declaration, or when the parties and organizations
currently using other methods serve as momentum of their own.

dlw: So you recognize that the old saw-horse of divide and conquer might be
at work to stymie election reform in the US???


dlw: Ethically, the burden of proof is on those who oppose the working
> consensus proposal for reform to show that their preferred approach
> is considerably better. I believe I have been holding to this ethical
> principle in my emails on this list.
>

KM:You have given proof based on your assumptions. You have then argued,
based on those assumptions, that the counters were not applicable (such as
that the theory is too theoretical or doesn't impact enough).

dlw: I have given plausible tweaks to rational choice assumptions that
serve to argue that |X_irv - X_oth|  < P_irv - P_oth and that the strategic
use of PR in the US is of even greater importance than purportedly
improving upon IRV.  My args have been deconstructive such that what
matters in teh short run are the short-run Ps, not the Xs or the long-run
Ps.

If that doesn't convince then such is life.

On 12/21/2011 05:10 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:

Let me add RBJ that I really do appreciate your comments in response to
> Kathy Dopp.  I would add that if the GOP/Prog Haters cd go back in time
> to the '09 election then IRV would have worked better because more of
> them would have voted strategically for the Dem candidate as their first
> ranked choice.  So I'd say 2009 was a learning election....  and I have
> no problems whatsoever with some still having to vote strategically.  I
> see this as a consequence of how IRV retains a tendency for there to be
> 2 major parties.  What it does is makes it so those 2 major parties are
> more dynamically drawn to be centered around the shifting de facto center.
>

KM: Also, let me see if I got this right. You're saying that instead of
having potentially direct multiparty rule by the use of an advanced method
(or at least, no worse a rule than under IRV), you want to have two-party
rule. You want to use a method that behaves strangely in certain
situations, and you want the voters to take up the burden of making it
behave properly by having them vote strategically.

dlw: I accept that 2 party domination is inevitable in the US or that it's
much, much easier to get election reforms in a two-party dominated system
when they do not challenge 2 party domination.  What matters is that the 2
parties are given incentives to become more dynamic and that
outsiders/dissenters are given voice and opportunities to move the center
around which the two major parties center themselves.

KM: So instead of a rule where people could vote mostly-honestly and could
possibly get multipartyism directly, you want something where people still
have to vote strategically and won't get anything more than (possibly
contested) two-party rule even when they do. And why? Because all the
momentum's with IRV?

dlw: Because even if I thought multi-party> two-party, I don't think it's
>> two-party and as a matter of political cultural change, it's best to
pick one's battles.  In my view, the critical problem in the US is it's
tendency to single-party rule, not whether there's a tendency to two-party
domination.  The latter can be contested more robustly and be more just if
the two parties are more dynamic.

KM: Doesn't that sound a bit bizarre? "I know of a voting method where you
could vote honestly, but because FairVote got to IRV first, you'll just
have to pinch your nose and vote strategically under IRV instead". Do you
think that argument would go over well with the voters?

dlw: More like, "There are an infinite number of election rules.  Many
claims have been made that such and such an election rule is the best.  I
make no such claim.  Neither do I claim that an even playing field across
all parties will end our problems.  What matters most is that we subvert
the cut-throat competition between our two biggest parties and make them
both give more voice to more people on more issues or else face their
replacement by other parties.  IRV and PR are well tested ways to do this.
 They'll make our democracy into a melding pot that balances the need for
hierarchy and equality, continuity and change."

KM: Why should we expect the voters to jump through hoops when electoral
reform is supposed to remove the need to jump through hoops? I could
understand your tradeoff if all that jumping through hoops gives you
something (e.g. multipartyism) the other rules don't, but IRV doesn't even
give you that.

dlw: It sets it up so that both major parties must adapt, listen to
dissenters, so as to reposition themselves around the true, moving center.
 When we become less ideologically stodgy, escaping the tailspin we got
caught in in recent decades for a number of reasons, we won't need an
EU-style multi-party system.  We'll do it our way...

dlw
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