[EM] Chris: Regarding the criteriion "failures" you mentioned for MMT

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Chris:

 You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump:

 I've already commented on that a few times.


 You said that MMT fails Condorcet's Criterion:

 But, as you know, CC is incompatible with FBC.


 You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd:

 I don't know what that criterion is. But, in any case, to
 say that a failure of it is important, you'd have to justify
 the criterion in terms of something of (preferably) practical
 importance.


 You said that MMT fails Minimal Defense:

 Plurality meets Minimal Defense. So my answer will refer to the
 universally-applicable counterpart to Minimal Defense: 1CM.

 Of course MMT fails 1CM. MMT doesn't recognize one-sided coalitions.
 Rather than being an accidental "failure", that is the point of MMT.

 To justify using 1CM against MMT, you'd need to tell why it's
 necessary to recognize one-sided coalitions. You'd need to justify
 it other than in terms of a criterion requiring that recognition.


 You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help:

 With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen,
 mutually-supported, majority coalition. Everyone supporting that coalition
 does so because they consider it beneficial to their interest.

 How is that a "failure"??

 In summary, you're citing those criteria as if their compliance is
 necessary, for its own sake. But when you do that, you need to
 say _why_ their compliance is necessary for its own sake.

For one thing, that depends on what we want. If we choose MMT, we
don't want one-sided support within a majority set of factions to
be counted, when that would mean "You help, you lose".

 Of course you could say that you don't want to avoid the
 cooperation/defection problem, and then tell why.

 As Jameson said, the chicken dilemma, also called
 the co-operation/defection problem, or the ABE problem, is
 the most difficult strategy problem to get rid of.

 However, there are a number of methods that do get rid of it,
 while complying with FBC and furnishing majority-rule protection:

 SODA, and several non-delegating methods:

 MMT, MTAOC, MMPO, MDDTR, and maybe a few others.

 Forest has just proposed one today, and so I haven't yet had
 the opportunity to study it. You (Chris) proposed one some time
 ago. Does it meet the criteria that you require, in addition to
 FBC and avoidance of the co-operation/defection problem?
 Can it be worded in a brief and simple, and naturally and
 obviously motivated way, for public propsal?

 We often cite criteria here. But, to a member of the public who looks
 here to evaluate a method proposed in hir jurisdiction, that will
 be a confusing jumble of mutually-contradictory requirements.

 That's why it's important that we also discuss _why_ we claim that
 a particular criterion is important.

 For instance, I've told why FBC is essential in the U.S.

 And I've told why it's important to avoid the co-operation/defection
 problem.

 Mike Ossipoff