[EM] Forest: MAMT

[C.Benham]

In my last post  (13 Dec 2011)  I wrote:

> A better method would  (instead of  "acquiescing majorities") use the
> set I just defined in my last post.
>
> *If there is a solid coalition of candidates S (as measured by the
> number of ballots on which those candidates are strictly voted above all
> others) that is bigger than the sum of all its rival solid coalitions
> (i.e. those that contain some candidate not in S), then those candidates
> not in the smallest such S are disqualified. Elect the most top-rated
> qualified candidate.*
>

That method I suggested wouldn't meet the FBC (it has now occurred to 
me), so I suspend my "..better method.." claim.

In my other EM post the same day, I wrote:

> I propose a replacement for Mutual Majority which addresses this problem
> and also unites it with Majority Favourite.
>
> Preliminary definitions:
>
> A "solid coalition" of candidates of size N is a set S of (one or more)
> candidates that on N number of ballots have all been voted strictly
> above all outside-S candidates.
>
> Any given solid coalition A's  "rival solid coalitions" are only those
> that contain a candidate not in A.
>
> Statement of criterion:
>
> *If one exists, the winner must come from the smallest  solid coalition
> of candidates that is bigger than the sum of all its rivals.*
>
> [end criterion definition]
>
> This wording could perhaps be polished, and I haven't yet thought of a
> name for this criterion and resulting set. (Any suggestions?)
>
> It might be possible to use the set as part of  an ok voting method.


Thinking about it a bit more I now doubt that the last sentence is true, 
but still I think it wouldn't be as bad for that purpose as the usual 
"Mutual Majority set".

Chris Benham