[EM] Sorry--One more revision of MMT

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Mutual-Majority-Top (MMT):

A set of candidates who are each rated above bottom by each member of the
same majority of the voters is a "majority candidate set".

If there are one or more majority candidate sets, then the winner is the
most top-rated candidate who is in a majority candidate set.

If there are no majority candidate sets, then the winner is the most
top-rated candidate.

[end of MMT definition]

The previous definition didn't allow for the fact that there can be overlapping
majorities of the voters.

MMT has the properties that I want (FBC, LNHa, ABE-non-failure, 3P), and avoids the
not-really-valid criticisms of Mono-Add-Plump failure and electing
C in Kevin's MMPO "bad"-example. 

That also seems to be true of Forest's FBC/ABE-passing method, which seems
to act quite similarly to MMT.

MTAOC too, with the added advantage of optional unconditional middle-rating
support for a lesser-evil.

We're always seeking better methods, and I'd like to find out if there's a simple wording
that would allow voters in MMT to have the option of giving unconditional middle-rating
support. But if I find that, I won't make it a replacement for the current MMT. I'll give
it a different name.

Likewise, it would be interesting if MTAOC, or something like it, could be written with
a complete description in a short paragraph (though there's nothing wrong with
its full definition being a computer program, while having a brief verbal description).

Those two goals probably amount to about the same thing.

Mike Ossipoff



 		 	   		  
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