[EM] Voting reform statement; a clearer and more inspiring version
Richard Fobes
ElectionMethods at VoteFair.org
Wed Aug 24 13:25:07 PDT 2011
I was attempting to use your post-feedback statement as an indication of
what methods to include in what I wrote, yet I am not familiar with the
variations on Bucklin voting beyond what I read in Wikipedia, so I am
certainly open to your suggested edits.
Just as you created a version that you expected to change as a result of
feedback, I too expect that what I wrote will be changed. As I
suggested in another response, I think it would be appropriate to post a
Google Docs version for you and others to edit. (In another response I
suggested some additional paragraphs, and those can be inserted into the
Google Docs version.)
I too welcome collaboration in this effort to create a declaration.
After all, the whole point of voting methods is to use a well-defined
process for arriving at a collaborative decision; in this case we do not
have a well-defined process, but basically we are voting for a
declaration most of us like. As in voting, everyone deserves an
informed vote in the process.
Speaking of which, I suggested using our signature lines as a way of
indicating which declaration-named election method we most prefer, and
that's a way of voting. It will be interesting to see which supporters
of which methods sign the document.
Admittedly that will place IRV proponents in the awkward position of
being tempted to sign it so they can indicate their support for IRV.
0 0
\___/
(I wouldn't be opposed to IRV if there was widespread recognition that
it uses the right kind of ballot but the wrong kind of counting. One
average-person reaction to this concept was "I didn't know there was
more than one way to count a ballot".)
Richard Fobes
On 8/24/2011 5:27 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> I like this version, and would sign on to it, as I would with all the
> other versions which have been discussed.
>
> 2011/8/23 Richard Fobes <ElectionMethods at votefair.org
> <mailto:ElectionMethods at votefair.org>>
>
> I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to
> write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the
> election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just
> providing a checklist of what we approve, I suggest we take
> advantage of this opportunity to ...
>
> * ... inspire(!) policymakers, politically active citizens, and
> frustrated voters to take action, and ...
>
>
> Yes. I believe that it is worth pointing out specific advantages for
> different groups, including centrist and extremist voters and major
> party and insurgent politicians. It may sound contradictory, but reform,
> by helping cause a healthier dialogue, can benefit all of these groups;
> the customary zero-sum model does not apply.
>
>
> * ... give them a clearly explained declaration they can use as
> ammunition in their battles to implement election-method reforms.
>
> To serve these purposes, I'm boldly suggesting an entirely new
> wording. Keep in mind that one of my professions has been to work as
> a technical writer specializing in translating especially complex
> technology into clear English, and I also have experience writing
> marketing materials.
>
> This version incorporates the suggestions and refinements already
> discussed, so the revision work already done is not being wasted.
>
> Previously I too was thinking that the other version was too long.
> Ironically this version is even longer. I now realize that the other
> version went into too much detail about subtle issues, and that's
> what made it seem long. In contrast, this version uses the extra
> words to clearly explain fundamental voting concepts that most
> people do not already understand, and to serve the above-listed
> purposes.
>
> Also I think (or at least hope) that this version better identifies
> our real areas of agreement.
>
>
> I like your explicit repetition and variations on "we agree". It works.
>
>
> My hope is that either this version, or a merging of this version
> with other versions, will produce a declaration that we can sign
> with much more enthusiasm.
>
> ----- The Declaration of Election-Method Experts -----
>
> We, the undersigned election-method experts from around the world,
> unanimously denounce the use of "plurality" voting in elections in
> which there are more than two candidates, and in this declaration we
> offer ready-to-adopt replacement election methods that we agree will
> reliably produce much fairer results.
>
> We agree that there are no perceived political or economic risks
> associated with adopting the election methods recommended here. In
> fact, we believe that improving the fairness of election results
> will produce many political and economic benefits. Some of the
> benefits we expect include reduced voter frustration, reduced
> government costs (that arise from excessive political influence from
> self-serving special interests), wiser use of tax dollars (based on
> electing problem-solving leaders who solve underlying problems that
> waste money), dramatically increased voter turnout because of having
> meaningful choices, increased compliance with laws including
> taxation laws, and likely increases in widespread economic
> prosperity (arising from increased fairness in the business world).
>
> We use the term "plurality" voting to refer to the commonly used
> counting method in which each voter marks only a single choice on
> the ballot, and the number of marks for each candidate are counted,
> and the candidate with the highest number is regarded as the winner.
> In some nations this method is called "First Past The Post" (and
> abbreviated FPTP). Although this election method produces fair
> results when there are only two candidates, the results are often
> dramatically unfair when this approach is used in elections with
> three or more candidates.
>
> In spite of its well-known weaknesses, plurality voting is
> predominantly used in most elections in most democratic nations
> around the world, with Australia and New Zealand being notable
> exceptions. It is also the preferred election method in nations that
> pretend to be democracies, yet lack the freedoms and economic
> benefits of democracy.
>
> Unanimously we agree that the kind of ballot used in plurality
> voting is not appropriate when there are more than two choices. Its
> deficiency is that it does not collect enough preference information
> from the voters in order to always correctly identify the most
> popular candidate when there are more than two candidates.
>
> Unanimously we agree that there are three kinds of ballots that
> collect enough preference information to always, or almost always,
> correctly identify the most popular candidate. The names and
> descriptions of these ballot types are, in alphabetical order:
>
> * Approval ballot, on which a voter marks each candidate who the
> voter approves as an acceptable choice, and leaves unmarked the
> candidates who are not acceptable
>
> * Ranked ballots (or 1-2-3 ballots), on which a voter indicates a
> first choice, and optionally indicates a second choice, and
> optionally indicates additional choices at lower preference levels
>
> * Score ballots, on which a voter assigns a number for each
> candidate, with the most familiar versions of such voting being to
> rate something with 1 to 5 stars or rate a choice with a number from
> 1 to 10, but any range of numbers can be used
>
> The type of ballot used in plurality voting does not have an
> academically recognized name, but the term "single-mark ballot" can
> be used to refer to this primitive ballot type.
>
> Why is the unfairness of plurality voting not better known?
> Single-mark ballots do not collect enough information to reveal the
> actual preferences of voters in elections that have three or more
> reasonably popular candidates. This lack of full preference
> information makes it nearly impossible for anyone to produce clear
> proof, or even evidence, of unfair election results.
>
> Adopting any of the three better ballot types would provide the
> information that is needed for fair results. In addition, for
> comparison purposes, the preferences on the three better ballot
> types can be interpreted to reveal who would have won the election
> if plurality counting had been used. Such comparisons will quickly
> reveal the dramatic unfairness of plurality voting in elections
> involving three or more candidates.
>
> These three better ballot types can be counted in different ways to
> produce different results. As election-method experts we have both
> developed and analyzed many counting methods, and we now agree that
> there are several counting methods that are worth adopting in
> governmental elections.
>
> Four of the counting methods that we agree would produce
> significantly better results compared to plurality voting are, in
> alphabetical order:
>
> * Approval voting, which uses approval ballots and identifies the
> candidate with the most approval marks as the winner.
>
> * Bucklin voting, which uses ranked ballots, and which initially
> counts only the most-preferred candidate on each ballot, and
> identifies a winner only if that candidate receives a majority of
> votes, and which successively adds consideration for lower-ranked
> candidates until a majority outcome is reached.
>
>
> I think that the majority judgment procedure might not be the best
> median-style system, but it is certainly the most clearly-defined modern
> Bucklin version. (Using just the word "Bucklin" is asking for confusion
> between the many similar Progressive-era systems which were called
> that). And MJ doesn't work by "sliding threshold" but by finding medians.
>
>
> * Condorcet methods, which use ranked ballots and pairwise counting
> to compare each candidate with each of the other candidates, with
> the winner being the candidate who is pairwise preferred over each
> and every other candidate. In some elections none of the candidates
> will win all of their pairwise comparisons, so there are variations
> that resolve these cases. These variations, in alphabetical order,
> are named the Condorcet-Kemeny method (or "VoteFair popularity
> ranking"), the Condorcet-Schulze (or "beatpath") method, and the
> Condorcet-Tideman (or "ranked pairs") method. (The word Condorcet is
> a French name that is pronounced "kon-dor-say".)
>
> * Range voting (also known as score voting), which uses score
> ballots, and adds together the scores assigned to each candidate,
> and identifies the winner as the candidate who receives the highest
> total score.
>
> There is another voting method that is supported by some, but not
> most, of the undersigned election-method experts. It is called
> "instant-runoff voting" (or "IRV" or "the alternative vote"), and it
> uses ranked ballots. The counting method begins by considering each
> voter's highest-ranked choice, and eliminating the candidate with
> the fewest votes, and then shifting the affected ballots to the
> next-most preferred candidate, and repeating this process until a
> candidate receives a majority of votes.
>
> Instant-runoff voting is used in some governmental elections
> throughout the world, and most of us agree that usually the results
> are an improvement over plurality voting. However, many of us either
> regard the degree of improvement as not being significant enough to
> justify adopting this method, or are concerned that its
> not-always-fair results will be associated with ranked ballots
> rather than with the instant-runoff counting method.
>
> Significantly some of the places that have adopted instant-runoff
> voting have later rejected the method and returned to plurality
> voting. These places include Aspen Colorado and Burlington Vermont
> in the United States. The rejections occurred because the method
> produced clearly unfair results, in which the winner would not have
> been the winner if any of the Condorcet methods had been used.
>
> In addition to the four supported methods listed above, we also
> support some combined methods. Specifically we support the use of
> the Condorcet method to identify a "Condorcet winner" (who is
> pairwise-preferred over all the other candidates) and then, if there
> is no Condorcet winner, we support using either instant-runoff
> voting (IRV) or approval voting to resolve the ambiguity and
> identify a single winner.
>
> In the list of signatures we indicate which voting method each
> signer most strongly prefers.
>
> Yet most of us also agree that we will support the adoption of any
> of the supported methods, namely, in alphabetical order:
>
> * Approval voting
>
> * Bucklin voting
>
> * Any of the Condorcet methods, which are, in alphabetical order:
>
> * Condorcet-Approval
> * Condorcet-IRV
> * Condorcet-Kemeny
> * Condorcet-Schulze
> * Condorcet-Tideman
>
> * Range voting
>
> (The choice of counting method determines which kind of ballot is
> needed.)
>
> The Wikipedia articles about these methods provide detailed
> descriptions and characteristics of these methods. In fact, many of
> us signing this statement edit these Wikipedia articles to keep them
> accurate and unbiased. (The academic names for these methods differ
> from the simplified names given here, so the Wikipedia "Voting
> system" article is a good starting article.)
>
> If you have specific questions about election methods, many of us
> participate in the "Election-Methods" forum (at
> http://lists.electorama.com/__listinfo.cgi/election-methods-__electorama.com
> <http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com>),
> and we would be happy to answer your questions about any of these
> methods. [Note: Can we set up a "redirect" to simplify this URL to
> something like www.electorama.com/election-__methods
> <http://www.electorama.com/election-methods>?]
>
> So far, all of the above recommendations apply to filling an
> executive (non-legislative) position such as a mayor or governor,
> where there is a single "seat" to be filled.
>
> Different considerations apply if an election fills a legislative
> seat, such as a seat in a legislature, parliament, or U.S. Congress.
> In Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the typical
> method for filling a legislative seat is to define a district or
> riding in which plurality voting is used to elect one person who is
> expected to represent the citizens in that district or riding.
>
> All of us signing this declaration agree that plurality voting is
> not acceptable as an election method for filling a single
> district-based or riding-based legislative seat.
>
> One way to improve legislative elections is to replace plurality
> voting with one of the above-supported election methods, and most of
> us support making this improvement.
>
> Most of us agree that a better choice would be to adopt an election
> method in which the choice of who wins one seat interacts with who
> wins another equivalent seat in ways that ensure that the overall
> composition of the legislature at least roughly matches the
> preferences of the voters, especially in terms of political-party
> preferences. However, we disagree about which election method best
> serves this purpose.
>
> Most European nations (but not the United Kingdom) use "proportional
> representation" to match legislative representatives with the
> political-party preferences of the voters. Specifically, when
> electing members of parliament (MPs) by this method, voters not only
> vote for a candidate, but they also indicate their favorite
> political party. Proportional representation then makes adjustments
> to ensure that the percentage of legislative seats filled by members
> of each party roughly matches the percentage of voters who support
> each party. In other words, if 15% of the voters mark the Green
> Party as their favorite, then approximately 15% of the parliamentary
> seats are filled by Green Party politicians.
>
> Proportional representation methods typically use either "open
> lists" or "closed lists" to determine which politicians are selected
> to fill the seats that are "won" by a party. The open-list approach
> allows voters to express preferences about which candidates they
> prefer for filling their party's seats. In the closed-list approach,
> the political party creates the ordered list from which their
> party's seats are filled, and voters do not participate in
> influencing the closed list.
>
> Almost all of us agree that where proportional representation is
> used, the open-list approach should be used. We oppose the
> closed-list approach because it transfers power to people who are
> not elected, and who cannot easily be removed from their position of
> power.
>
> In governments where a single legislative representative is elected
> from each district or riding, a political manipulation named
> "gerrymandering" is used to influence the positions of district or
> riding boundaries. Such boundary manipulations affect which
> political party is favored to win the elections in each district or
> riding, and in turn this affects the legislative balance of power
> between political parties. It also reduces voter turnout because the
> election results are so difficult to change through voting.
>
> Unanimously we agree that gerrymandering is unfair. Almost
> unanimously we agree that either better voting methods can be used
> to make the boundary positions much less influential in the balance
> of power between political parties, or that there are fair and
> impartial ways to choose the boundaries. However, we do not agree on
> which such methods are best, so we are not recommending a specific
> solution to the gerrymandering problem.
>
> Overall our highest priority is to stop the use of plurality voting
> in elections that involve three or more choices, and to replace
> plurality voting with one of the alternative election methods
> recommended here.
>
> We, as election-method experts, have spent the last decade
> developing online resources about election methods, developing
> software for numerous election methods, and participating in online
> discussions to identify which election methods are worth adopting as
> replacements for plurality voting. Now we are sharing our
> recommendations. We also offer to share our deep understanding of
> election methods with policymakers and politically active citizens
> of any nation, state, province, municipality, or political party.
>
> We realize that election-method reforms are unlikely to start with
> people in positions of great power because they have made many
> sacrifices to achieve their power, and they do not want their
> efforts to be undermined.
>
> Therefore we address this statement to you as someone who is aware
> of the benefits that election-method reforms will bring.
>
> If you are a policymaker, we strongly urge you to introduce
> legislation that would adopt one of the election methods we support.
> If you are active in a political party that uses plurality voting,
> we strongly urge you to encourage the use of a better voting method
> to choose your party's candidates, or to choose your party's
> internally elected delegates or representatives. If you are
> politically active, we strongly urge you to tell others about the
> unfairness of plurality voting, and to bring attention to the fairer
> election methods supported in this declaration. If you are a
> frustrated voter, we strongly urge you to learn about one or more of
> the election methods we support, and then tell others what you have
> learned. And if you are a member of an organization that elects
> officers using plurality voting, we strongly urge you to advocate
> using one of the recommended election methods when an election
> involves more than two candidates.
>
> We, the following election-method experts, agree with the statements
> made in this declaration.
>
> ----- End of draft -----
>
> Clarification: I did not use the academic name "preferential ballot"
> to refer to ranked ballots because the term "preferential ballot"
> deserves to win a prize as the most redundant two-word phrase. (The
> whole point of a ballot is to collect preferences!) The alternate
> name of "1-2-3 ballot" comes from a Canadian who is promoting
> election-method reform.
>
> Clarification: I did not include the SODA method because it has not
> yet been fully peer reviewed, it is not explained in Wikipedia
> (which provides further peer reviewing), and it has not been
> successfully tested in actual voting situations. Remember that we
> hope to get this declaration signed by election-method experts who
> do not participate in the Election-Methods forum, and we are
> recommending these methods for use in governmental elections where
> the risk of "trying something new" is not acceptable.
>
>
> I understand your concerns. One good compromise would be to mention it
> as a method that merits further study. I believe that this is justified.
> It is clearly a young method, but it is one which has favorably
> impressed several knowledgeable people who are not particularly inclined
> to agree with each other.
>
> I also note that you included Bucklin but not Majority Judgment. If I
> had to choose one of these, it would be MJ. I don't think that it's
> necessarily the best median-based method, but the differences in results
> between such methods are trivial, and MJ is a good representative member
> of the class. Also, it is probably the most clearly-defined
> class-member; it is discussed in the academic literature and has a
> pretty good Wikipedia article.
>
>
> Perspective: As a reminder, recall that this Election Method forum
> started as a spin-off from a general-purpose Elections forum because
> these discussions use too much jargon and mathematics for mainstream
> participation. By including clear, plain-English explanations of
> fundamental election-method concepts in our declaration, we can
> re-connect with those people. Also we can connect with the many
> other people who advocate election-method reform, but who lack our
> election-method expertise. They can use our signed declaration as
> ammunition in their battles against plurality voting.
>
> Finally I'll close with a suggested format for signatures (where the
> third portion indicates affiliation):
>
> Richard Fobes; Portland, Oregon, USA; VoteFair.org; prefers
> Condorcet-Kemeny method
>
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