[EM] : Chicken problem (was: SODA and the Condorcet

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/8/6 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

> Jan,
>
> IRV elects C like all of the other methods if the B faction doesn't
> truncate.  But IRV elects A when the B
> faction truncates.  Of course, with this knowledge, the B faction isn't
> likely to truncate, and as you say C
> will be elected.
>
> The trouble with IRV is that in the other scenario when the B faction
> truncates sincerely because of
> detesting both A and C, IRV still elects A instead of B.
>

Also, if the A faction votes A>B, then B clearly should win, but does not
under IRV. So yes, IRV solves the chicken dilemma, but in so doing causes
other problems. (This same argument, as it happens, works against tree-based
methods.)

I still claim that SODA is the only system I know of that can solve the
chicken dilemma without over-solving it and making other problems.
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