[EM] Record activity on the EM list?

[Juho Laatu]

On 4.8.2011, at 14.21, James Gilmour wrote:

> There is only one real issue in elections: representation of the voters.
> 
> If in a single winner partisan election the voters vote 51% for A and 49% for B, we have a major problem in representation.

Ok, 49% of the voters without representation.

If one uses single-member districts to elect multiple representatives, then this means also some randomness in the results. This is not really a problem of single-winner methods themselves but a problem in how they are used (as multi-winner methods).

> 
> But if the voters vote in the same way (51% to 49%) in a two-member election, any sensible voting system will give one seat to A and
> one seat to B.
> 
> Compared to that difference in providing "representation of the voters", all the other differences between single-winner and
> multi-winner elections are trivial.

From this point of view single-winner methods are more "problematic" than multi-winner methods (at least when used to elect multiple representatives from single-member districts). This problem of single-winenr methods is quite impossible to fix (most single-winner methods respect the will of the majority).

The 51% vs. 49% problem is present also in accurately proportional representative bodies since also those bodies may make majority decisions. One way to alleviate this kind of narrow majority related problems is to seek compromise decisions. That is what in principle happens e.g. in coalition governments. Coalition governments may represent well over 50% of the voters. Let's assume that this is the case. The program of the government may contain multiple topics that would be 51% vs. 49% questions in the representative body or among the voters, but probably all coalition members will get more than they lose. Let's assume that the coalition is heterogeneous so that it does not agree on all the 51% vs. 49% decisions that is has to make. Maybe there are two 51% vs. 49% topics that go the right way against every one such topic that goes wrong. In that way we don't have a narrow majority that always makes 51% decisions but a supermajority that has considerably higher support behind everything it does (although all parties of the coalition do not like all the decisions).

In two-party systems the balance is based more on two alternating policies. Often both parties have quite centrist policies since both try to meet the needs of the median voters. In some topics they may however have also clearly opposite positions. I guess the overall policy and results of two-party system governments are typically more 51% majority driven than in multi-party governments. (Coalition governments may however also have only narrow majority and the coalitions may be quite fixed, e.g. left vs. right, and as a result their decisions may follow the 51% majority style.)

My point is just that in addition to multi-winner methods and proper PR one may need "the art of compromise decisions" to get rid of the strongest 51% vs. 49% . This discussion went already quite far from the technical properties of the single-winner methods, but maybe this kind of compromise making related problems can be considered to be one key problem that the different methods and their use in societies should try to address (if the case that one wants to replace "the dictatorship of narrow majority" with "horse trading deals of larger majorities").

Juho




> 
> James
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com 
>> [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On 
>> Behalf Of Juho Laatu
>> Sent: Thursday, August 04, 2011 7:07 AM
>> To: EM list
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Record activity on the EM list?
>> 
>> 
>> Yes, there are areas where single-winner methods are more 
>> challenging. For example multi-winner STV works better than 
>> single-winner STV, and it is easier to collect sincere 
>> ratings in multi-winner methods than in single-winner 
>> methods. On the other hand the field of study may be wider in 
>> multi-winenr methods (a bit like N is more complicated than 
>> 1). In multi-winner methods we may have some additional 
>> aspects to study and solve like proportionality, geographical 
>> proportionality and the computational complexity related 
>> problems tend to cause problems. Individual problems may thus 
>> be more numerous in multi-winner methods although some 
>> individual problems may be more challenging in single-winner methods.
>> 
>> Juho
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 3.8.2011, at 19.35, James Gilmour wrote:
>> 
>>> Juho Laatu  > Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2011 6:04 AM
>>>> Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated
>>>> than single-winner methods. 
>>> 
>>> I disagree.  It is much easier to obtain a "satisfactory" 
>>> (representative, acceptable) outcome for a multi-winner 
>> election than 
>>> it is to obtain a "satisfactory" (representative, 
>> acceptable) outcome 
>>> for a single-winner election.  Choosing a method to elect the 
>>> candidate who best represents the voters in a single-winner 
>> election 
>>> is the most difficult challenge in electoral science.  As 
>> soon as you 
>>> elect two or more candidates together, many of the problems 
>> disappear.
>>> 
>>> James Gilmour
>>> 
>>> 
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