[EM] Record activity on the EM list?

[Peter Zbornik]

Hi Jameson,

I like the slate-nominating feature it requires the nominators of the
slates to think about the "best" composition of the council and not about
"their" candidates.
This encourages deliberation and discussion across partisan "borders", I
imagine, in order to find the perfect mix.

Slate nomination is used in Sweden a lot, where a nomination committee gets
the assignment to find "the ideal" slate.
By allowing everyone to nominate slates, this nomination committee might not
be needed, or would get some competition, I imagine.

I like letting the voters do some deliberation and cross-partisan
communication in order to ease the pain of the computer in evaluating
zillions of slates.

Peter

On Wed, Aug 3, 2011 at 2:22 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:

>
>
>  2011/8/3 Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk>
>
>> I noticed that there was a lot of activity on the multi-winner side.
>> Earlier I have even complained about the lack of interest in multi-winner
>> methods. Now there are still some interesting but unread mails in my inbox.
>>
>> Multi-winner methods are, if possible, even more complicated than
>> single-winner methods. Maybe one reason behind the record is that there are
>> still so many uncovered (in this word's regular non-EM English meaning)
>> candidates to cover.
>>
>> Juho
>>
>
> OK, on the theme of simple multi-winner systems I haven't seen described
> before, here's a simple Maximal (that is, non-sequential) Bucklin PR, MBPR.
> Now that the sequential bucklin PR methods have been described, it's the
> obvious next step:
>
> Collect ratings ballots. Allow anyone to nominate a slate. Choose the
> nominated slate which allows the highest cutoff to assign every candidate at
> least a Droop quota of approvals. Break the tie by finding the one which
> allows the highest quota of approvals per candidate (the slate whose members
> each satisfies the most separate voters). If there are still ties
> (basically, because you've reached the Hare quota, perfect representation,
> aside from bullet-vote write-ins) remove the approvals you've used, and find
> the maximum quota per candidate again (that is, look to for the slate whose
> members each "double satisfies" the most separate voters).
>
> Obviously, this needs to use the contest method to beat its NP-complete
> step. But all the rest of the steps are computationally tractable. Except
> for the NP-completeness, this or some minor variation thereof (diddling with
> the order of the tiebreakers between threshold, quota, and double-approved
> quota) seems like the optimal Bucklin method. I'd even go so far as to say
> that it seems so natural and "right" to me that, if it weren't NP-complete,
> I'd consider using it as a metric for other systems, graphing them on how
> well they do on average on the various tiebreakers.
>
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>
>
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