[EM] AQ variant of DSC

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

One way of looking at Woodall's DSC method is that it is designed to elect from the clone set that 
extends up to the top rank on the greatest number of ballots, i.e. kind of the plurality winner among 
clone sets.

There are two ways in which this description is not precise, but maybe we would get a better method if 
we follwed this description more closely.

(1)  The solid coalitions look like clone sets on the ballots that reach up to the top, but they don't have to 
look like clone sets on the other ballots.

(2)   This description doesn't tell how DSC narrows down after finding the plurality winner solid coalition.  
In fact the entire set of candidates is automatically the solid coalition that extends to the top rank on 
100% of the ballots, so for starter we need to narrow down to a proper sub-coalition.

With regard to (1),  imagine a one dimensional issue space with the candidates distributed as follows:

A..............B1..B2..B3...................C......................D1..D2...........E

The set {B1, B2, B3} and the set  {D1, D2}  will be solid coalitions that extend to the top rank on the 
ballots of the voters that have a favorite among them, and they will appear as clone sets on all of the 
ballots that do not rank C first.  But voters near C may well intermingle the B's and the D's like

C >B3>D1>B2>D2>B1>E>A

This shows that a geometrical clone doesn't have to end up as a classical ballot clone except on the 
ballots of the voters that are situated in the middle of the clone set, in which case they will appear as 
solid (or assenting) coalitions that extend to the top rank.  

So Woodal had the right idea for making his method clone independent.

If I uderstand correctly, Woodall invented DSC to prove a point, viz. that a method can satisfy later no 
harm, be clone free, and montone.  He didn't invent the method as a serious proposal.  So I don't think 
his feelings will be hurt if we suggest an improvement.

My suggestion is that once we have found the proper subset solid coalition that extends to the top rank 
on the greatest number of ballots, strike from the ballots the candidates that are not in that coalition, and 
iterate until there is only one candidate left.  Elect the sole remaining candidate.

For incomplete rankings we can modify DAC in the same way, by replacing the term "solid" with the 
term "assenting."