[EM] [CES #3371] SODA

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/8/8 Warren Smith <warren.wds at gmail.com>

> > SODA is extremely easy for the voters; in fact, no voting system is
> simpler to vote
> --it is pretty simple, but it seems to me plain approval is simpler.
> You're exaggerating.
>

Approval ballot is simpler, by one box. Approval strategy is way, way more
complex.


>
> > Under SODA, there is no need for dishonesty from individual voters. A
> voter can safely vote for any candidate that they honestly agree with,
> without fear of that vote being wasted; or safely vote an honest
> approval-style ballot, if they do not agree with any candidate's preference
> order.
> --One can invent scenarios where "dishonest" SODA voting is
> strategically forced,
> i.e. you (as a voter) approve someone you like less than someone you
> do not approve.  For example, in the 2 liberals vs 2 conservatives
> scenario in first example of
>   http://www.rangevoting.org/RVstrat2.html
> in a situation where the candidates all refuse to state preference
> orders (or state orders you dislike).


Since the advantage gained here is a tiny one, I don't think that counts as
a "need".



> Another example: it seems to me
> in 3-candidate race with plurality-style
> delegating votes SODA becomes equivalent to instant runoff voting with
> 3 pre-stated vote types.


Not at all. The CW or minimax/etc.... winner will win.


> It then suffers all the paradoxes obtainable
> from IRV via 3 vote types, e.g. favorite betrayal, and see
>    http://www.rangevoting.org/CompleteIdioticIRV.html
> This is true even if every voter honestly agrees with the 3 available
> preference orders,
> and noting that a vote "A>B>C" via delegation is "more honest" than a
> vote such as
> "approve A and B."
>

How would you put this advantage?


>
> >SODA is easier to count and more fraud-resistant than most systems,
> including IRV. It also can be run on most voting machines, including even
> old and outdated systems.
> --somewhat debatable.  It is certainly less easy to count than plain
> approval.
> Fraud resistance? Well, it's immune to some kinds but not to other kinds.
> Overall I'd say it probably offers more fraud opportunities than plain
> plurality.
>

Yeah, I added that one at the last minute. Mostly I was comparing to IRV.



>
>
>
> --
> Warren D. Smith
> http://RangeVoting.org  <-- add your endorsement (by clicking
> "endorse" as 1st step)
> and
> math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html
>
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