[EM] election strategy paper, alternative Smith, web site relaunch

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> James Green-Armytage wrote:
> 
>> So, the nomination results are a little less robust, but many of them 
>> seem pretty intuitive. For example, it makes perfect sense to me that 
>> plurality would be most vulnerable to strategic exit, and that minimax 
>> would be minimally vulnerable to strategic nomination. It also makes 
>> sense that Borda would be highly vulnerable to strategic entry (I give 
>> some intuition for this in proposition 21), but I'm not as yet able to 
>> give a good explanation for why Bucklin seems to be even more 
>> vulnerable to strategic entry. Does anyone here want to try their hand 
>> at that? I added Bucklin and Coombs to the paper at kind of the last 
>> minute (September), so there's at least some possibility of a 
>> programming glitch, but I've checked through several examples, and it 
>> seems to be working properly, as far as I can tell.
> 
> Perhaps adding allied candidates in Bucklin delays the point at which 
> other candidates can get a majority. Say you have some friendly voters 
> who votes A first, as well as a bunch of other voters who may vote 
> another candidate B in any position. B wins. Then the friendly voters 
> turn A into A1, A2, A3, etc. On every ballot that votes A ahead of B, 
> this will push B further away so that the voters who do vote B ahead of 
> A don't get their contribution to B aligned with the A>B voters' 
> contribution to B until much later, at which point A might already have 
> won.

To be a little more precise, I mean that A1, A2, A3 etc. enter, as in 
strategic nomination, and that all voters, not just the friendly ones, 
rank them.