[EM] election strategy paper, alternative Smith, web site relaunch

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

James Green-Armytage wrote:

> So, the nomination results are a little less robust, but many of them 
> seem pretty intuitive. For example, it makes perfect sense to me that 
> plurality would be most vulnerable to strategic exit, and that minimax 
> would be minimally vulnerable to strategic nomination. It also makes 
> sense that Borda would be highly vulnerable to strategic entry (I give 
> some intuition for this in proposition 21), but I'm not as yet able to 
> give a good explanation for why Bucklin seems to be even more vulnerable 
> to strategic entry. Does anyone here want to try their hand at that? I 
> added Bucklin and Coombs to the paper at kind of the last minute 
> (September), so there's at least some possibility of a programming 
> glitch, but I've checked through several examples, and it seems to be 
> working properly, as far as I can tell.

Perhaps adding allied candidates in Bucklin delays the point at which 
other candidates can get a majority. Say you have some friendly voters 
who votes A first, as well as a bunch of other voters who may vote 
another candidate B in any position. B wins. Then the friendly voters 
turn A into A1, A2, A3, etc. On every ballot that votes A ahead of B, 
this will push B further away so that the voters who do vote B ahead of 
A don't get their contribution to B aligned with the A>B voters' 
contribution to B until much later, at which point A might already have won.

I'm not sure if that's possible, but if it is, it could explain things. 
If I'm right, the entry effect should be drastically reduced if the A>B 
voters truncate after A: then A will win both before it is cloned and after.