[EM] Fair and Democratic versus Majority Rules

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Mon Nov 15 18:30:47 PST 2010


On Nov 15, 2010, at 8:40 PM, Bob Richard wrote:

> On 11/15/2010 4:58 PM, fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:
>> When majority rules, a 51 percent majority can have their way in  
>> election after election. But what other
>> possible standard is there for democracy and fairness besides  
>> "majority rule?"
>
> For seats in legislative bodies, proportional representation.

for which STV or a more Condorcet-like ordering (what would the name  
of that be? Kristofer Munsterhjelm had a Schulze ordering for Oakland)  
does well. here in Vermont we just had an election where for my state  
senate district, we voted for 6 out of about 15 and the top 6 vote  
getters win seats, but that method sorta sucks.

>> One answer is that every sector of the population ought to have a  
>> chance at being in charge, and that
>> chance should be in rough proportion to the size of the sector of  
>> the population.
>
> What does "being in charge" mean? If it means "making the rules",  
> see my response above. If it means "implementing/administering/ 
> enforcing the rules", then I think any form of lottery would lead to  
> chaos and possibly rebellion

no shit.  unless there is a perfect tie, random chance should not be  
in the rules for deciding who governs people, school districts,  
nations, armies, etc.

> during the occasional terms in office of officials representing  
> small minorities. Sortition is very feasible for specific kinds of  
> legislative assemblies, specifically those whose purpose is to  
> propose measures to be voted on in referenda. I don't think it can  
> work for deciding who gets to run the executive branch.

for me, if it's a single winner: "If a majority of voters select  
Candidate A over Candidate B then, if at all possible, Candidate B  
should not be elected" is the only sensible rule, because of the  
converse is so clearly contrary to the concept of the will of the  
majority.  Any method that cannot be guaranteed to accomplish that  
risks the question: e.g. "Why should Bob Kiss be the mayor of  
Burlington when 587 more voters expressed on their ballots that they  
thought Andy Montroll was a better choice?".

i think you can argue that Condorcet compliant is always preferable  
out of point by contradiction.  if there is a CW and you elect someone  
else, that is always a failure.

--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."







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