[EM] What is Range good for (was: A four bit (sixteen slot) range style ballot)

[Juho]

Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote below:

> In other words, failing the Condorcet Criterion is not a flaw of  
> Range Voting, it is a strength. However, it is also true that under  
> some conditions, condorcet failure can indicate a problem with  
> Range, and so some of my work has been aimed at detecting and fixing  
> that problem.
...

> From there I realized that the ballot could be full Range and that  
> therefore, from it, a Condorcet winner could be detected, and if  
> this winner differs from the Bucklin/Approval/Range winner, a runoff  
> could be triggered. What this amounts to is the rough equivalent of  
> a ratification combined with a runoff. Range voting easily may fail  
> to satisfy the basic democratic principle of majority rule, so,  
> technically, a Range result should be ratified. To be efficient,  
> though, the ratification may be combined with a consideration of at  
> least one alternative, and perhaps two or three. With a good voting  
> system, and with what have become, in the runoff, well-informed  
> voters, having the results of the first poll -- which could be  
> printed on the ballot! -- majority ratification of a result is quite  
> likely.


This is a quite good description of the border area between Condorcet  
and Range. This approach may be useful in environments that are not  
fully competitive but not fully non-competitive either. I tend to  
think that there is no single answer to all the voting needs of the  
world. There may be many kind of single-winner elections with  
different needs and different voter behaviour. An environment that  
hangs somewhere between being majority decision driven and non- 
competitive expressed utility driven may not bee very common but  
definitely an interesting special case. If the voters are fully  
competitive and majority driven (very common in political elections)  
then the Range part may be just additional information for polling  
purposes, and the majority winner will win the runoff. In that case  
basic Condorcet method would be sufficient (one would just lose the  
more or less sincere polling info).

The described method could work better if one would arrange the runoff  
between the Range winner and the winner of some Condorcet Method (if  
they differ) (not only if there is a Condorcet winner) since then the  
voters could be confident that they will have their chance of getting  
the majority oriented winner, and they would be more free to give more  
sincere Range ratings.

One approach would be to allow the voters to declare their strategy.  
That would eliminate the need of a separate runoff election. One could  
have e.g. three three options for the runoff between the Range winner  
and the Condorcet Method winner. 1) Interpret my ballot as ratings. 2)  
Interpret my ballot as rankings. 3) Rearrange my ballot so that it  
will maximally support the (sincere) Range winner. (Fourth (maybe not  
as popular, maybe more rebellious) option could be to maximally  
support the Condorcet method winner.) The runoff would be a Range  
election between two candidates. Strategy 1 would cast a "weak Range  
vote". Strategy 2 would cast a majority/Condorcet oriented vote  
(exaggerated "re-normalized" Range vote). Strategy 3 would allow the  
voter to change her opinion to support the Range winner (maximally).

(There are some opportunities for strategic voting. The majority  
oriented / competitive voters could give insincere ratings to pick  
appropriate candidates for the runoff or just to make the poll results  
look better (low points to strong competitors, or to candidates that  
might rise too high in the next elections, or simply low points to all  
others but one's favourites). Strategic ratings could play a role also  
in the polls before the actual election.)

This combination of Condorcet methods and Range could be a nice  
approach at least in environments where one "tries to teach the voters  
to become more non-competitive". This situation might not be very  
common in politics, and this balanced state of affairs would might  
often not be stable (= a state that would last over several  
elections), but certainly this approach is worth a try and a good  
discussion point in some environments (maybe first in some clubs and  
associations, maybe in some deliberative teams that you often  
advocate). Maybe there are also some stable environments that could  
use this approach continuously. It could be interesting to study what  
would happen if there would be some stable segments of voters falling  
into the different strategic categories. But I will not jump into that  
for now.

Juho




On Jun 13, 2010, at 6:50 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 11:53 AM 6/11/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>> Hi Abd,
>>
>> The best way to decide how to apply rank ballot criteria to  
>> Approval is to
>> have a framework for all methods into which you can translate  
>> Approval.
>> People may not agree with you but at least it's clear what you have  
>> done.
>>
>> --- En date de : Ven 11.6.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com 
>> > a écrit :
>> > My contention there was that Approval Voting satisfies the
>> > Majority Criterion if Plurality satisfies the criterion.
>>
>> But you say this and then quote Woodall's Majority criterion, which
>> Plurality fails?
>
> Plurality allows voters to place a candidate at the "top of their  
> preference listings." Does Plurality fail Woodall's Majority  
> Criterion? That depends on interpretations. The criterion was not  
> designed and defined well enough to be sure. What is a "preference  
> listing"?
>
> There is social choice theory and there is election method theory  
> and they are not actually the same, though they are certainly related.
>
>
>> > The contrary argument, if I can summarize it, is that if a
>> > majority of voters prefer A to B, but actually vote for both
>> > A and B, then it is possible that B wins if some other
>> > voters only vote for B. The wording of the criterion by
>> > Woodall is
>> >
>> > > * Majority. If more than half the voters put the same
>> > set of
>> > > candidates (not necessarily in the same order) at the
>> > top of their
>> > > preference listings, then at least one of those
>> > candidates should be elected.
>> >
>> > The way this criterion is worded, Approval satisfies the
>> > criterion based on actual votes, but not necessarily based
>> > on internal preferences, for that majority might, for
>> > example, all prefer A to B but actually vote for A and B.
>>
>> But within Woodall's framework, all methods have to be interpreted as
>> rank. Woodall uses an interpretation of Approval so that it will  
>> fit in
>> his framework. You don't have to use that interpretation. But arguing
>> about whether a method satisfies a Woodall criterion without any  
>> attempt
>> to stay within Woodall's framework seems futile.
>
> Basically, the term "Majority Criterion" went on to be used by  
> others in various ways, with various definitions and interpretations.
>
> I think you may know that my position on "voting systems criteria"  
> in general is that they are a failed attempt to create objective  
> standards for comparing voting systems. They do have uses, but they  
> become ammunition in political wars over voting systems, and the  
> actual practical implications of the criteria are often obscure. In  
> particular, some criteria *seem* to be obviously desirable, but turn  
> out, on deeper examination, to be contradictory to what people, the  
> "electorate," would be likely to decide if all the cards were laid  
> on the table, all the preferences were thoroughly known, and then  
> the group of people made the optimal decision for their collective  
> welfare.
>
> Great example is the Condorcet criterion. The Condorcet winner can  
> be, under conditions that may be revealed if voters cast sincere and  
> accurate Range ballot, contradictory to the optimal decision, *as  
> the voters will agree when the true preferences and preference  
> strengths are revealed.*
>
> In other words, failing the Condorcet Criterion is not a flaw of  
> Range Voting, it is a strength. However, it is also true that under  
> some conditions, condorcet failure can indicate a problem with  
> Range, and so some of my work has been aimed at detecting and fixing  
> that problem. What I came across, early on in this study, was the  
> fact that standard deliberative process, with its procedure and  
> requirement of a majority for any decision, was far more  
> sophisticated than anything I've seen said about it from voting  
> systems theorists. Repeated ballot is a very powerful method! But  
> with the vote-for-one limitation, it can be inefficient; in actual  
> practice, candidate withdrawals and voting shifts handle what could  
> be handled more directly with Approval. Range could make the process  
> even more efficient, and then I came to the understanding that  
> Bucklin was an Approval system, simulating a series of repeated  
> ballot Approval elections, driven by a Range ballot.
>
> From there I realized that the ballot could be full Range and that  
> therefore, from it, a Condorcet winner could be detected, and if  
> this winner differs from the Bucklin/Approval/Range winner, a runoff  
> could be triggered. What this amounts to is the rough equivalent of  
> a ratification combined with a runoff. Range voting easily may fail  
> to satisfy the basic democratic principle of majority rule, so,  
> technically, a Range result should be ratified. To be efficient,  
> though, the ratification may be combined with a consideration of at  
> least one alternative, and perhaps two or three. With a good voting  
> system, and with what have become, in the runoff, well-informed  
> voters, having the results of the first poll -- which could be  
> printed on the ballot! -- majority ratification of a result is quite  
> likely.
>
> Determining elections with a single ballot is a basic violation of  
> democratic principles, when a true majority has not been found that  
> has explicitly approved the result. Certainly it may be argued that  
> efficiency requires it, but the claim that multiple ballots are  
> impractical has been shown to be false again and again. Sure, there  
> is a cost, but ... apparently it has been considered worthwhile,  
> often. But don't expect the top two political parties, in general,  
> to support it. They would rather risk an occasional spoiler. Hence  
> top two runoff has *mostly* been confined to nonpartisan elections.
>
> Fine. That's the place to start. Don't dump the best voting system  
> in common use to replace it with a system with the same problems,  
> but without the benefits -- other than fixing the spoiler effect  
> which TTR also fixes. Instead, replace the primary with a system  
> that can develop far more information from the electorate, that will  
> more commonly find a majority, because it counts all the votes, and  
> that is much more likely to find a condorcet winner, but which can  
> also detect an approval and range winner. Bucklin, driven by a Range  
> ballot with adequate resolution, used as a primary in a runoff  
> system, could be, with certain runoff rules, not only Majority and  
> Condorcet criterion compliant, but, as well, social utility  
> maximizing, reserving to the majority the right to reject a "range  
> winner" if they choose. Usually, I contend, they won't, unless it is  
> so close that the difference is academic with little damage being  
> done to social utility.
>
> This is new, I believe, the concept of maximization of social  
> utility with ratification when necessary, thus preserving majority  
> rule (which is very important). Many theorists in the field have  
> simply assumed that a runoff would ratify the Condorcet winner, a  
> result of not considering how turnout affects results, and how  
> turnout is a basic component of democratic process. People who don't  
> care don't bother to vote, even if they have *some preference*. Thus  
> standard vote-for-one, particularly with repeated ballot, was more  
> sophisticated than we thought.
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