[EM] A four bit (sixteen slot) range style ballot
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
abd at lomaxdesign.com
Sat Jun 12 20:50:29 PDT 2010
At 11:53 AM 6/11/2010, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>Hi Abd,
>
>The best way to decide how to apply rank ballot criteria to Approval is to
>have a framework for all methods into which you can translate Approval.
>People may not agree with you but at least it's clear what you have done.
>
>--- En date de : Ven 11.6.10, Abd ul-Rahman
>Lomax <abd at lomaxdesign.com> a écrit :
> > My contention there was that Approval Voting satisfies the
> > Majority Criterion if Plurality satisfies the criterion.
>
>But you say this and then quote Woodall's Majority criterion, which
>Plurality fails?
Plurality allows voters to place a candidate at
the "top of their preference listings." Does
Plurality fail Woodall's Majority Criterion? That
depends on interpretations. The criterion was not
designed and defined well enough to be sure. What is a "preference listing"?
There is social choice theory and there is
election method theory and they are not actually
the same, though they are certainly related.
> > The contrary argument, if I can summarize it, is that if a
> > majority of voters prefer A to B, but actually vote for both
> > A and B, then it is possible that B wins if some other
> > voters only vote for B. The wording of the criterion by
> > Woodall is
> >
> > > * Majority. If more than half the voters put the same
> > set of
> > > candidates (not necessarily in the same order) at the
> > top of their
> > > preference listings, then at least one of those
> > candidates should be elected.
> >
> > The way this criterion is worded, Approval satisfies the
> > criterion based on actual votes, but not necessarily based
> > on internal preferences, for that majority might, for
> > example, all prefer A to B but actually vote for A and B.
>
>But within Woodall's framework, all methods have to be interpreted as
>rank. Woodall uses an interpretation of Approval so that it will fit in
>his framework. You don't have to use that interpretation. But arguing
>about whether a method satisfies a Woodall criterion without any attempt
>to stay within Woodall's framework seems futile.
Basically, the term "Majority Criterion" went on
to be used by others in various ways, with
various definitions and interpretations.
I think you may know that my position on "voting
systems criteria" in general is that they are a
failed attempt to create objective standards for
comparing voting systems. They do have uses, but
they become ammunition in political wars over
voting systems, and the actual practical
implications of the criteria are often obscure.
In particular, some criteria *seem* to be
obviously desirable, but turn out, on deeper
examination, to be contradictory to what people,
the "electorate," would be likely to decide if
all the cards were laid on the table, all the
preferences were thoroughly known, and then the
group of people made the optimal decision for their collective welfare.
Great example is the Condorcet criterion. The
Condorcet winner can be, under conditions that
may be revealed if voters cast sincere and
accurate Range ballot, contradictory to the
optimal decision, *as the voters will agree when
the true preferences and preference strengths are revealed.*
In other words, failing the Condorcet Criterion
is not a flaw of Range Voting, it is a strength.
However, it is also true that under some
conditions, condorcet failure can indicate a
problem with Range, and so some of my work has
been aimed at detecting and fixing that problem.
What I came across, early on in this study, was
the fact that standard deliberative process, with
its procedure and requirement of a majority for
any decision, was far more sophisticated than
anything I've seen said about it from voting
systems theorists. Repeated ballot is a very
powerful method! But with the vote-for-one
limitation, it can be inefficient; in actual
practice, candidate withdrawals and voting shifts
handle what could be handled more directly with
Approval. Range could make the process even more
efficient, and then I came to the understanding
that Bucklin was an Approval system, simulating a
series of repeated ballot Approval elections, driven by a Range ballot.
From there I realized that the ballot could be
full Range and that therefore, from it, a
Condorcet winner could be detected, and if this
winner differs from the Bucklin/Approval/Range
winner, a runoff could be triggered. What this
amounts to is the rough equivalent of a
ratification combined with a runoff. Range voting
easily may fail to satisfy the basic democratic
principle of majority rule, so, technically, a
Range result should be ratified. To be efficient,
though, the ratification may be combined with a
consideration of at least one alternative, and
perhaps two or three. With a good voting system,
and with what have become, in the runoff,
well-informed voters, having the results of the
first poll -- which could be printed on the
ballot! -- majority ratification of a result is quite likely.
Determining elections with a single ballot is a
basic violation of democratic principles, when a
true majority has not been found that has
explicitly approved the result. Certainly it may
be argued that efficiency requires it, but the
claim that multiple ballots are impractical has
been shown to be false again and again. Sure,
there is a cost, but ... apparently it has been
considered worthwhile, often. But don't expect
the top two political parties, in general, to
support it. They would rather risk an occasional
spoiler. Hence top two runoff has *mostly* been
confined to nonpartisan elections.
Fine. That's the place to start. Don't dump the
best voting system in common use to replace it
with a system with the same problems, but without
the benefits -- other than fixing the spoiler
effect which TTR also fixes. Instead, replace the
primary with a system that can develop far more
information from the electorate, that will more
commonly find a majority, because it counts all
the votes, and that is much more likely to find a
condorcet winner, but which can also detect an
approval and range winner. Bucklin, driven by a
Range ballot with adequate resolution, used as a
primary in a runoff system, could be, with
certain runoff rules, not only Majority and
Condorcet criterion compliant, but, as well,
social utility maximizing, reserving to the
majority the right to reject a "range winner" if
they choose. Usually, I contend, they won't,
unless it is so close that the difference is
academic with little damage being done to social utility.
This is new, I believe, the concept of
maximization of social utility with ratification
when necessary, thus preserving majority rule
(which is very important). Many theorists in the
field have simply assumed that a runoff would
ratify the Condorcet winner, a result of not
considering how turnout affects results, and how
turnout is a basic component of democratic
process. People who don't care don't bother to
vote, even if they have *some preference*. Thus
standard vote-for-one, particularly with repeated
ballot, was more sophisticated than we thought.
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