[EM] IRV vs Plurality (or is it about Range? maybe it should be about Condorcet.)

[Juho Laatu]

On Jan 29, 2010, at 3:36 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:

>
> On Jan 28, 2010, at 5:13 PM, Juho wrote:
>
>> On Jan 28, 2010, at 10:33 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>>
>>> On Jan 28, 2010, at 3:12 PM, Juho wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Jan 28, 2010, at 8:20 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>>> ...
>>>>> it's amazing that anyone touts Range as the most strategy free.   
>>>>> the more handles one finds on a control device (think of the  
>>>>> ballot as such) or the more positions one can set the knobs to,  
>>>>> the more one has to strategize on how to control it to one's  
>>>>> intent.
>>>>
>>>> The basic Range strategy is unfortunately present in almost all  
>>>> elections,
>>>
>>> i don't see how it would be with a simple ranked-order ballot.   
>>> especially, if decided by Condorcet, you cannot exaggerate your  
>>> rankings.  if you like A better than anyone and you like B better  
>>> than C, then there is nothing to be gained by any other ranking  
>>> than A>B>C.  if you really hate C, you can rank a bunch of other  
>>> candidates you don't care about between B and C.  but it doesn't  
>>> change how the election would work between the candidates A, B,  
>>> and C.
>>
>> Yes, the main rule in Condorcet is that sincere voting is enough.  
>> Condorcet has also strategic vulnerabilities but in most  
>> environments one can expect those problems to be so marginal that  
>> sincere voting will be dominant and is the most practical  
>> "strategy" for all voters.
>
>
> again, other than to attempt to throw an election (decided by  
> Condorcet rules) into a cycle, i can't think of any situation where  
> it would serve any voter's political interests to rank a less  
> preferred candidate higher than one that is more preferred.  and,  
> it's hard for me to imagine such a strategy serving the voter(s)  
> using it, since it could be anyone's guess how the cycle that they  
> create gets resolved.

To be exact, one could also break an already existing cycle for  
strategic reasons (compromise to elect a better winner). And yes, the  
strategies are in most cases difficult to master (due to risk of  
backfiring, no 100% control of the voters, no 100% accurate  
information of the opinions, changing opinions, other strategic  
voters, counterstrategies, losing second preferences of the targets of  
the strategy).

Juho


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