[EM] IRV vs Plurality (or is it about Range? maybe it should be about Condorcet.)

[robert bristow-johnson]

On Jan 28, 2010, at 5:13 PM, Juho wrote:

> On Jan 28, 2010, at 10:33 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
>> On Jan 28, 2010, at 3:12 PM, Juho wrote:
>>
>>> On Jan 28, 2010, at 8:20 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>> ...
>>>> it's amazing that anyone touts Range as the most strategy free.   
>>>> the more handles one finds on a control device (think of the  
>>>> ballot as such) or the more positions one can set the knobs to,  
>>>> the more one has to strategize on how to control it to one's  
>>>> intent.
>>>
>>> The basic Range strategy is unfortunately present in almost all  
>>> elections,
>>
>> i don't see how it would be with a simple ranked-order ballot.   
>> especially, if decided by Condorcet, you cannot exaggerate your  
>> rankings.  if you like A better than anyone and you like B better  
>> than C, then there is nothing to be gained by any other ranking  
>> than A>B>C.  if you really hate C, you can rank a bunch of other  
>> candidates you don't care about between B and C.  but it doesn't  
>> change how the election would work between the candidates A, B,  
>> and C.
>
> Yes, the main rule in Condorcet is that sincere voting is enough.  
> Condorcet has also strategic vulnerabilities but in most  
> environments one can expect those problems to be so marginal that  
> sincere voting will be dominant and is the most practical  
> "strategy" for all voters.


again, other than to attempt to throw an election (decided by  
Condorcet rules) into a cycle, i can't think of any situation where  
it would serve any voter's political interests to rank a less  
preferred candidate higher than one that is more preferred.  and,  
it's hard for me to imagine such a strategy serving the voter(s)  
using it, since it could be anyone's guess how the cycle that they  
create gets resolved.

--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."