[EM] Two simple alternative voting methods that are fairer than IRV/STV and lack most IRV/STV flaws

[Dave Ketchum]

On Jan 20, 2010, at 12:48 PM, Chris Benham wrote:
> Dave Ketchum wrote (18 Jan 2010):
>
> "In response I will pick on LNH for not being a serious reason for
> rejecting Condorcet - that such failure can occur with reasonable
> voting choices for which the voter knows what is happening.  Quoting
> from Wikipedia:
>
>> For example in an election conducted using the Condorcet compliant
>> method Ranked pairs the following votes are cast:
>> 49: A
>> 25: B
>> 26: C>B
>> B is preferred to A by 51 votes to 49 votes. A is preferred to C by
>> 49 votes to 26 votes. C is preferred to B by 26 votes to 25 votes.
>> There is no Condorcet winner and B is the Ranked pairs winner.
>> Suppose the 25 B voters give an additional preference to their
>> second choice C.
>> The votes are now:
>> 49: A
>> 25: B>C
>> 26: C>B
>> C is preferred to A by 51 votes to 49 votes. C is preferred to B by
>> 26 votes to 25 votes. B is preferred to A by 51 votes to 49 votes.
>> C is now the Condorcet winner and therefore the Ranked pairs winner.
>> By giving a second preference to candidate C the 25 B voters have
>> caused their first choice to be defeated.
>
>
> Pro-A is about equal strength with anti-A.  For this it makes sense
> for anti-A to give their side the best odds with the second vote
> pattern, not caring about LNH (B and C may compete with each other,
> but clearly care more about trouncing A)."
> <snip>
>
> Dave,
> Your assumption that  "B and C may compete with each other, but  
> clearly
> care more about trouncing A"  is based on what?

That one faction votes ONLY for A, and the other faction votes  
exclusively against A.  Then some anti-As vote for both B and C.  The  
B voters considering voting for B>C is consistent with this.
>
>
> The ballots referred to contain only the voters' rankings, with no  
> indications
> about their relative preference strengths.

The voting implies strength of preference.
>
> If you read my entire post you will see that in it I endorse three  
> methods,
> one of which is a Condorcet method.

This starts with my dislike for IRV, which started with my first  
hearing of that method and immediately liking Condorcet as better -  
before having heard of either method name.  From that have to reject  
LNHarm for incompatibility - and thus respond to your liking of LNH.
>
Dave Ketchum
>
> Chris Benham