[EM] Utah Republican Party Scraps IRV Voting Method

[robert bristow-johnson]

On Jan 7, 2010, at 8:45 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 7, 2010 at 8:28 PM, robert bristow-johnson
> <rbj at audioimagination.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Jan 7, 2010, at 7:55 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
>>
>>> I've answered that question on this list before and Abd ul also  
>>> answered
>>> it.
>>>
>>> There are *many* good alternative voting methods that do solve the
>>> spoiler problem, are monotonic, and elect majority winners and are
>>> precinct summable.
>>
>> would this list include Condorcet?
>
> Yes.  Condorcet is precinct-summable in an n x n matrix where n is the
> number of candidates.

i knew that.  but what i wanted to know is if, from where you stand,  
it was one of the acceptable alternatives to IRV.  or if your ideal  
solution is to return to the "traditional" runoff or just first-past- 
the-pole.

>>> I don't know of any alternative voting methods as
>>> bad as IRV/STV (although there must be one somewhere), so I would
>>> probably support almost any alternative method that lacks the
>>> multitude of flaws that IRV/STV have.  Abdul has convinced me that
>>> regular top-two runoffs are good too.
>>
>> i'm sure as hell not convinced.  if that were the case in  
>> Burlington in
>> 2009, a candidate would be elected on Runoff Day that was less  
>> preferred by
>> the electorate than an identified specific candidate who was not  
>> included in
>> the runoff.
>
> Well, let's just say top-two runoff is precinct-summable, monotonic,
> virtually always finds majority winners, preserves voters' rights and
> otherwise lacks most of the major flaws of IRV/STV, but does not solve
> all the flaws of plurality that IRV/STV was incorrectly envisioned as
> solving.

with that i agree with you on everything.  but, for Burlington, until  
we get Condorcet, i still think that IRV does a better job than  
plurality of solving the main problem of rewarding the compromising  
strategy for supporters of 3rd-party candidates.  but i do not  
understand why anyone would envision the ranked-order ballot, skip  
over the Condorcet concept (something i thought of 38 years ago in  
high school, 3 decades before reading the term "Condorcet"), and come  
up with the STV method.  specifically the arbitrary threshold that  
the weakest candidate to eliminate is the one with the fewest 1st- 
pick votes (that 2nd-pick count as well as last pick).  whose idea  
was that?  even in high school, i knew that the problem was in the  
difference on how people who are idealistic would choose their  
candidate in a multi-party or multi-candidate race compared to if  
there were only two candidates.  the latter is a simple problem for  
both the voter and for the election system.  no strategies to be had;  
vote for the candidate you like the most or vote for the candidate  
you like the least.  there is no reason why the latter would serve  
any political interest of the voter, so he/she may as well vote  
sincerely and hope for the best.  but once there is a credible 3rd  
candidate, that is no longer the case.  all Condorcet does (assuming  
there *is* a Condorcet winner) is extend the concept to the extra  
candidates.  if there is a Condorcet winner and if that person is  
always elected to office, there is no reason why the multi-candidate  
election would turn out better for anyone by trying to be tricky.   
throwing a Condorcet election into a cycle for strategic reasons is  
pretty risky and i've never been convinced that a cycle is common at  
all.  and if a cycle does happen, Tideman ranked-pairs is fine, as  
far as i can tell.  Shulze is probably better, but hard to explain to  
Joe 6-pack.  but i can explain Condorcet to Joe 6-pack.  it's simple  
enough.

thanks for responding, Kathy.

--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."