[EM] "good method" ? , was "IRV ballot pile count (proof of closed form)"

Kathy Dopp kathy.dopp at gmail.com
Sat Feb 13 12:29:26 PST 2010


> From: Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>
> Rob LeGrand wrote (11 Feb 2010):
>
> <snip>
>
> 35:A
> 32:B>C
> 33:C,
>
> by which I mean
>
> 35:A>B=C
> 32:B>C>A
> 33:C>A=B.
>
> In this example, C is the Condorcet winner even though C does not have a
> majority over B.? I can see how this example could be seen as an
> embarrassment to the Condorcet criterion, in that a good method might not
> choose C as the winner.
>
> <end quoted message>

I agree with Chris (below), If you require every winner to "have a
majority *over*" ever other candidate, then there is no system that
would give you any winners.  Clearly above, C has 65 votes and B only
has 35 votes, at least in scenario #1 above.

Guessing as to what voters really mean, by assuming scenario #2 from
scenario #1 -- you may have read the minds of all those voters who you
believe all think exactly alike in each category, incorrectly.
However, in scenario #2, I think A is the correct winner.

I think election methods enthusiasts too often think they can read
voters' minds and translate votes between between two different
scenarios for voters.

Kathy

>
> Rob,
>
> Well I can't. Electing A would be a violation of the Minmal Defense criterion,
> and electing B would violate Woodall's Plurality criterion and Condorcet Loser.
>
> What "good method" do you have in mind that might not elect C?
>
> And what's good about it?
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
>
>

-- 

Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."

Realities Mar Instant Runoff Voting
http://electionmathematics.org/ucvAnalysis/US/RCV-IRV/InstantRunoffVotingFlaws.pdf

Voters Have Reason to Worry
http://utahcountvotes.org/UT/UtahCountVotes-ThadHall-Response.pdf

Checking election outcome accuracy
http://electionmathematics.org/em-audits/US/PEAuditSamplingMethods.pdf



More information about the Election-Methods mailing list