[EM] "good method" ? , was "IRV ballot pile count (proof of closed form)"

[Chris Benham]

Rob LeGrand wrote (11 Feb 2010):

<snip>

35:A
32:B>C
33:C,

by which I mean

35:A>B=C
32:B>C>A
33:C>A=B.

In this example, C is the Condorcet winner even though C does not have a
majority over B.  I can see how this example could be seen as an
embarrassment to the Condorcet criterion, in that a good method might not
choose C as the winner.

<end quoted message>

Rob,

Well I can't. Electing A would be a violation of the Minmal Defense criterion,
and electing B would violate Woodall's Plurality criterion and Condorcet Loser.

What "good method" do you have in mind that might not elect C?

And what's good about it?

Chris Benham