[EM] Instant Runoff Voting 3-candidate elections - pathologies considerably more common than you may have thought

[Jameson Quinn]

2010/8/27 robert bristow-johnson <rbj at audioimagination.com>

>
> On Aug 27, 2010, at 2:29 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>  Bucklin, too.
>>
>
> Bucklin uses the same ranked-choice ballot that Condorcet or IRV or Borda
> uses (ignoring that some allow for equal ratings), so it can be compared
> directly to any.  and if we assume that the highest rank vote is the same as
> the "single affirmative vote" of FPTP, it can be compared to that.
>
> my position is that sometimes these methods elect the Condorcet winner and
> sometimes they do not.  i would say that at least one pathology exists when
> they elect someone different than the Condorcet winner.
>
>
>
>  >> It is reasonable, in the face of such massive and frequently-arising
>> >> evidence that IRV has (obvious) problems, to promote it, as opposed to
>> >> some simpler method largely free of such problems?
>> >
>> >
>> > is the some simpler method either Approval or Score Voting?
>> >
>> > what simpler method are you suggesting, Warren?
>>
>
>
>
>  2010/8/27 Warren Smith <warren.wds at gmail.com>
>> --score & approval are simpler and are comparatively free of crazy
>> pathologies.
>>
>
> i started engaging Clay Shentrup about this, but i really felt "piled upon"
> at his ESF group (i quickly unsubscribed) and that they were not listening
> at all.  but this main thesis you're selling, Warren, needs discussion and
> defending.  and it should be here rather than at ESF, which really should be
> renamed the Score Voting Advocacy Forum.
>
> i will say this again; both Score (or Range) Voting and Approval Voting
> have *inherent* strategic (or "tactical", i really don't know which word is
> best used, i *do* know the difference in a military context) burdens for the
> voter.  because, as i examine my own feelings about voting, and as i talk
> with other voters about election systems (because of IRV and a credible
> third party, there is a lot of discussion about it here in Vermont), both
> Score and Approval will degenerate to Plurality for voters that just do not
> wish to harm their favorite candidate.  and, in talking with people and
> examining my own motivations, i really believe that this is most voters.  if
> the large majority of voters score their fav with 99 and everyone else gets
> 0 (and the equivalent with approval), how is that any different than a
> scaled outcome of FPTP?  these methods will differ from FPTP (which i *know*
> sucks) only to the degree that people will forsake their favorite, at least
> a little.
>

But people are already forsaking their favorite in FPTP, by strategically
voting for the lesser-evil frontrunner. Presumably, such people would at
least also vote top-score for all candidates better than that frontrunner.
This fact would, in turn, change the frontrunner dynamics, favoring
candidate quality instead of money for becoming a perceived frontrunner.

There are still several possible pathologies (including current third-party
voters who might bullet vote for the wrong reasons), but this situation
would still be markedly superior to the status quo.


>
> and, in the Chittenden State Senate district in Vermont, we *virtually*
> have Approval (vote for up to 6; top 6 vote-getters are seated) and i can
> tell you first hand that nearly *everyone* that is politically savvy at all
> bullet vote for one or maybe two candidates.  and the vote totals (that are
> about 1/4 of the maximum) bear that out.  we actually *worry* about if
> voting for someone we would rather see elected over the jerks in the other
> party will actually harm our favorite candidate.  i haven't met a single
> person who told me they used all 6 of their votes.
>

Multi-candidate, low-profile elections are a different kettle of fish.

>
> with Score and Approval, it's easy to mark your favorite candidate
> (Score=99 or Approval=1).  and we know that Satan gets Score=0 or
> Approval=0.  then what do you do with other candidates that you might think
> are better than Satan?  that question has never been answered by Clay.  and
> any answer must be of a strategic nature.
>

I agree with you here, but think that the strategic equilibrium with real
human voters would still be superior to plurality, as I explained above.

JQ
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