[EM] Proportional election method needed for the Czech Green party - Council elections

[Juho]

On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:22 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:

> On Apr 26, 2010, at 5:18 PM, Juho wrote:
>
>> On Apr 27, 2010, at 3:01 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>>
>>> On Apr 26, 2010, at 4:45 PM, Juho wrote:
>>>
>>>> Draft of a method:
>>>>
>>>> - collect ranked votes
>>>> - use Condorcet to determine P (Condorcet tends to elect a  
>>>> compromise candidate that all voters find reasonably good)
>>>> - use STV (using the same ballots) to elect the group of P and  
>>>> VPs (some special rules are needed to guarantee that the already  
>>>> named P will not be eliminated in the process but will be elected)
>>>> - use STV (using the same ballots) to elect members of the board  
>>>> (some special rules are needed to guarantee that the already  
>>>> named P and VPs will not be eliminated in the process but will be  
>>>> elected)
>>>>
>>>> One could elect P and VPs also later. In that case one could  
>>>> elect them from the members of the (already existing) board.  
>>>> Otherwise the process would be similar.
>>>
>>> This is a better approach, I think. Protecting already-elected  
>>> members and preserving proportionality is a subtle problem, and I  
>>> don't think there's a completely satisfactory solution available.  
>>> It's defensible for filling vacancies (below), but when it can be  
>>> avoided, it should be. (Unless someone has a great idea for this  
>>> kind of countback.)
>>>
>>> A burial strategy for P would have unfortunate effects for the STV  
>>> election, is a possible problem.
>>
>> The STV election that follows may also reduce the incentives to try  
>> the burial strategy. That is because (in addition to burial not  
>> being a very efficient strategy in the first place) the benefit  
>> would be only to get a better P but not more voting power in the  
>> board, and because the modified vote could well contribute to the  
>> benefit of the competing sections in the proportional election.
>
> It's a reasonable argument (though the STV election should go  
> first), if the voters are reasonable and if they regard the P office  
> as less important than the makeup of the board--that depends on how  
> the office is defined, I suppose.
>
> Another alternative would be to hold a separate P election (new  
> ballots) once the board is defined. Or to let the board elect the  
> officers from amongst themselves. That appeals to me, actually,  
> again depending on the definition of the roles.

A fully separate P election would make the board less proportional -  
unless the elected P would have voting power only if he/she is already  
a member of the board.

Juho