[EM] (Possibly) new method/request for voting paradoxes. :)

[robert bristow-johnson]

On Oct 13, 2009, at 1:58 AM, Juho wrote:

> Welcome to the list!

thanks.

> On Oct 13, 2009, at 7:48 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
>> it is also important to have a deterministic and monotonic measure  
>> of voter support that is understandable to the less scholarly
>
> I have often promoted the measure of least additional votes  
> required to become a Condorcet winner as one understandable and  
> natural/fair (and simple, easy to display) measure of which  
> candidate is the best. This measure leads to the minmax(margins)  
> method. The "least additional votes" approach minimizes the  
> strength of opposition to change the winner to any single  
> alternative winner after the election (and thereby aims at making  
> the society more stable).
>
> Not all on this list agree that minmax(margins) is a good method.  
> It may in some extreme cases elect outside the Smith set. But in  
> such cases the defeats within the Smith set are stronger than  
> defeats of the winner outside the Smith set, so electing that  
> candidate would not break my heart :-).
>
> When deciding which Condorcet method is best some people put more  
> weight on resistance against strategic voting while some try to  
> optimize the output with sincere votes. Different environments may  
> have different needs with respect to strategic voting. In  
> environments where strategies are not expected to be a problem (in  
> Condorcet methods) one may use the latter type of criteria.
>
> Just wanted to point this out since you seemed to make the  
> assumption that the best winner must come from the Smith set.

yeah, i guess i have made that assumption (or conclusion).  i think  
the same reasoning applies; to select a non-Smith candidate over a  
Smith set candidate seems to violate the same really basic principle  
of democracy as selecting someone else over the Condorcet winner if a  
Condorcet winner exists.  anyone inside the Smith set clearly beats  
anyone outside of the Smith set if the voters are asked to simply  
choose between the two.

from a political POV (not the academic one of worrying about obscure  
details of hypotheticals that seem to me to be very unlikely to ever  
happen in the context of a simple political spectrum), the *most*  
important concern in my agenda is to promote Condorcet over any other  
method and to worry about which Condorcet less.  *some* method to  
resolve a potential Condorcet cycle *does* have to be determined, in  
advance, wherever Condorcet is adopted, but *which* method (as long  
as it is meaningfully consistent with some monotonic measure of voter  
preference) is less of a concern for me.  and, if some really good  
argument comes up to change one Condorcet method to another, i would  
likely say "whatever" and i could vote either way.

i really think that moving away from 2 dominant parties and Choice  
Voting is extremely important in the political marketplace, and even  
though i supported it in the past, that all of these people plugging  
IRV should be plugging Condorcet instead or, at least, along with IRV  
as the alternative to plurality and/or delayed runoff.  and i really  
don't like the "happy talk" from the IRV activists (like fairvote)  
about the "unmitigated successes" of IRV when i have seen it to fail,  
first hand.

BTW, "hi" to Terry Bouricius and/or Rob Ritchie, if they be hangin'  
out here.

--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."