[EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

[Dave Ketchum]

Trying to sort this out as to Condorcet and LNH:

Seems that cycles are involved before, after, or both.  And the voters  
change their votes, getting more affect on result than they might  
expect.  So what, assuming the counters properly read the vote?

I agree with those who expect cycles to be rare.  Still, it is the  
more important races that are more likely to result in cycles.

What I see as important is that, assuming analysis of the election is  
done both officially and by others, it should be practical to decide  
whether the official result was correct, considering the N*N vote  
count.  In other words, the official analysis should not be complex -  
especially not to gain trivial improvement in quality of official  
result.

Dave Ketchum

On Nov 25, 2009, at 3:08 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
> On Nov 25, 2009, at 10:05 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
>> Robert Bristow-Johnson wrote (9 Nov 2009):
>>
>> "Of course IRV, Condorcet, and Borda use different methods to  
>> tabulate
>> the votes and select the winner and my opinion is that IRV ("asset
>> voting", i might call it "commodity voting": your vote is a
>> "commodity" that you transfer according to your preferences) is a
>> kabuki dance of transferred votes.  and there is an *arbitrary*
>> evaluation in the elimination of candidates in the IRV rounds: 2nd-
>> choice votes don't count for shit in deciding who to eliminate (who
>> decided that?  2nd-choice votes are as good as last-choice?  under
>> what meaningful and consistent philosophy was that decided?), then
>> when your candidate is eliminated your 2nd-choice vote counts as much
>> as your 1st-choice."
>>
>> Regarding IRV's "philosophy": each voter has single vote that is  
>> transferable
>> according to a rule that meets Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and  
>> Majority
>> for Solid Coalitions.
>>
>> I rate IRV (Alternative Vote with unlimited strict ranking from the  
>> top) as the
>> best of the single-winner methods that meet Later-no-Harm.
>
>
> On Nov 25, 2009, at 2:41 PM, Warren Smith wrote:
>
>> Are there any other voting methods besides IRV, meeting the
>> 'later no harm' criterion?
>
>
> my understanding is that the later-no-harm result happens only if  
> the case of a Condorcet cycle (the prevalence of which i am dubious  
> about).  where there is a Condorcet winner and that person is  
> elected, is there still possible later harm?
>
> i hadn't thought of it before but i s'pose that since Condorcet  
> *does* give preference to centrist candidates over solid coalition  
> candidates (in comparison to IRV rules).  i knew before that  
> Condorcet sorta favors centrist candidates because voters in either  
> the left or right fringes (that do not pick the centrist candidate  
> as their 1st-choice) likely pick the centrist as their 2nd-choice.   
> that's nice for political interests of centrist voters, but that is  
> no reason to pick an election method.  the reason that IRV or *any*  
> non-Condorcet method is problematic for the interest of democracy is  
> that any candidate elected that is not the Condorcet winner is  
> elected despite the fact that the majority of voters expressed that  
> they wanted someone else *specifically* on their ballots.
>
> when IRV or Borda or whatever happens to elect the Condorcet winner,  
> they seem to do pretty well.  when they fail to do that, voters have  
> reason to wonder: "didn't more of us prefer that other guy?  how'd  
> this guy get elected?"  isn't that what democracy is about?: if more  
> of us prefer Candidate A to Candidate B, then it isn't Candidate B  
> who gets elected.
>
> other than the possible cycle, in which some kinda pathologies can  
> happen, i still don't see a pimple on it.
>
> r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com