[EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?
robert bristow-johnson
rbj at audioimagination.com
Wed Nov 25 13:55:37 PST 2009
On Nov 25, 2009, at 3:26 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> robert bristow-johnson wrote:
>
>> my understanding is that the later-no-harm result happens only if
>> the case of a Condorcet cycle (the prevalence of which i am
>> dubious about). where there is a Condorcet winner and that person
>> is elected, is there still possible later harm?
>
> As far as I remember, Condorcet and LNHarm has the property that
> LNHarm isn't, by itself, violated as long as there is a CW, but the
> transition from CW to no CW (or vice versa) makes it inevitable
> that there will be a LNHarm-violating discontinuity *somewhere*.
the degree of inevitability is an issue. if "inevitable" is measured
as a binary value, the i s'pose it's inevitable. if "inevitable" is
measured as a probability of a cycle occurring per election-year,
then i think it's a small number. if cycles are rare, the mean
percentage of elections that have Condercet cycles is small. when we
somehow figure out a merit metric for an election system, a low-
likelihood of a pathology that has low cost (say, if a cycle happens
you elect using IRV rules, how bad can that be?) should contribute
(negatively) negligibly to the merit metric.
> In other words, as long as you stay within the CW domain, there is
> no LNHarm failure, but there is no way to engineer a completion
> rule to maintain this for every CW<->no CW transition.
sure, but i'm still dubious about the product of likelihood times
cost of occurrence of that.
> I'm not entirely sure about that, though - can anyone confirm?
and i continue to wonder (really) how a possibly rare occurrence of a
no-CW election (with its LNHarm consequence) becomes a greater
concern than that of the likelihood and cost of electing a candidate
against the expressed wishes of a majority of the electorate. i
think that cost (electing the wrong candidate) is reasonably high and
that the likelihood of it happening is definitely non-zero because it
has happened in the Vermont town i am a resident of.
> Not that this bothers me - LNHarm seems to me to be a criterion of
> "don't take the full picture into account". Consider a negotiation
> situation: if everybody keeps their cards close to their chests
> (i.e. vote bullet style), there can be no compromise; but if
> they're willing to reach further, one might find an option that,
> while not the favorite of any, is good enough for all.
i would call that the essential measure of a popular election. it's
utilitarian: we maximize satisfaction for the franchised about the
governance of whatever organization by pleasing more people with a
decision than we displease. that's the reason we have elections, we
could adopt rules to give it to the minority candidate if that
candidate reaches a certain threshold, but we don't do that for
binary decisions, we consistently give it to the majority.
--
r b-j rbj at audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
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