[EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval and range voting?

[robert bristow-johnson]

On Nov 25, 2009, at 10:05 AM, Chris Benham wrote:

> Robert Bristow-Johnson wrote (9 Nov 2009):
>
> "Of course IRV, Condorcet, and Borda use different methods to tabulate
> the votes and select the winner and my opinion is that IRV ("asset
> voting", i might call it "commodity voting": your vote is a
> "commodity" that you transfer according to your preferences) is a
> kabuki dance of transferred votes.  and there is an *arbitrary*
> evaluation in the elimination of candidates in the IRV rounds: 2nd-
> choice votes don't count for shit in deciding who to eliminate (who
> decided that?  2nd-choice votes are as good as last-choice?  under
> what meaningful and consistent philosophy was that decided?), then
> when your candidate is eliminated your 2nd-choice vote counts as much
> as your 1st-choice."
>
> Regarding IRV's "philosophy": each voter has single vote that is  
> transferable
> according to a rule that meets Later-no-Harm, Later-no-Help and  
> Majority
> for Solid Coalitions.
>
> I rate IRV (Alternative Vote with unlimited strict ranking from the  
> top) as the
> best of the single-winner methods that meet Later-no-Harm.


On Nov 25, 2009, at 2:41 PM, Warren Smith wrote:

> Are there any other voting methods besides IRV, meeting the
> 'later no harm' criterion?


my understanding is that the later-no-harm result happens only if the  
case of a Condorcet cycle (the prevalence of which i am dubious  
about).  where there is a Condorcet winner and that person is  
elected, is there still possible later harm?

i hadn't thought of it before but i s'pose that since Condorcet  
*does* give preference to centrist candidates over solid coalition  
candidates (in comparison to IRV rules).  i knew before that  
Condorcet sorta favors centrist candidates because voters in either  
the left or right fringes (that do not pick the centrist candidate as  
their 1st-choice) likely pick the centrist as their 2nd-choice.   
that's nice for political interests of centrist voters, but that is  
no reason to pick an election method.  the reason that IRV or *any*  
non-Condorcet method is problematic for the interest of democracy is  
that any candidate elected that is not the Condorcet winner is  
elected despite the fact that the majority of voters expressed that  
they wanted someone else *specifically* on their ballots.

when IRV or Borda or whatever happens to elect the Condorcet winner,  
they seem to do pretty well.  when they fail to do that, voters have  
reason to wonder: "didn't more of us prefer that other guy?  how'd  
this guy get elected?"  isn't that what democracy is about?: if more  
of us prefer Candidate A to Candidate B, then it isn't Candidate B  
who gets elected.

other than the possible cycle, in which some kinda pathologies can  
happen, i still don't see a pimple on it.

--

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."