[EM] Anyone got a good analysis on limitations of approval andrange voting?
Jonathan Lundell
jlundell at pobox.com
Mon Nov 16 13:44:56 PST 2009
On Nov 16, 2009, at 2:15 PM, Andrew Myers wrote:
> Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>> This is in part Arrow's justification for dealing only with ordinal (vs cardinal) preferences in the Possibility Theorem. Add may label it preposterous, but it's the widely accepted view. Mine as well.
> Arrow's Theorem seems like a red herring in the context of the cardinal vs. ordinal debate. IIA makes just as much sense when applied to range voting as it does to ranked voting. Arrow was just making a simplifying assumption and I don't see that it makes his results lose generality.
I don't have his proof in front of me (I'm on the road), but I'm pretty sure that it assumes ordinal ranking.
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