[EM] About non-monotonicity and non-responding to previous posts...
Dave Ketchum
davek at clarityconnect.com
Tue Nov 10 12:51:01 PST 2009
What I wrote last time is about as simple as you get. Canceling the
smallest margin cancels a three-member cycle, leaving the strongest
member as CW. Could take more canceling for more complex, and thus
rarer, cycles.
Dave Ketchum
On Nov 10, 2009, at 7:54 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>> Trying some fresh thinking for Condorcet, and what anyone should be
>> able to see in the X*X array. I am ignoring labels such as Schulze
>> and Ranked Pairs - this is human-doable and minimal effort -
>> especially with normally having a CW and most cycles having the
>> minimal three members.
>> 1. Look at any pair of candidates. Loser is not the CW (there
>> can be a tie in any comparison here - NOT likely in a normal
>> election, but we have to be prepared with responses for such).
>> 2. If there are other possible CWs, repeat step 1 with latest
>> winner and one of them.
>> 3. If there are other candidates latest winner has not been
>> compared with, compare it with each of them.
>> 4. If winner wins each of these, it is CW.
>> 5. Winner and each who beat it in step 4 are cycle members. Also,
>> any candidate beating any of these is also a cycle member.
>> IF there is a CW, it should win - anything else is a complication,
>> even if some math makes claims for the something else.
>> Otherwise a simple cycle resolution should apply. Simply
>> canceling the smallest margin has been thought of - that value
>> means minimum difference in vote counts between actual and what is
>> assumed.
>> Note that each cycle member would be CW if remaining cycle
>> members were ignored.
>> As to voting:
>> Equal ranks permitted.
>> Write-ins permitted, and such a candidate wins with the same
>> vote counts as if nominated.
>> As to clones, strategy, primaries, and runoffs - all seem best
>> ignored, though only a nuisance if some are determined to involve
>> such.
>
> Okay, so let's see which *simple* cycle breaker provides as much as
> possible. To do that, we'll need to find out what simplicity means,
> and how to define "as much as possible".
>
> That could be interesting in itself.
>
> Ranked Pairs (or River) seems nice, but even it may be too complex.
> Sports usually employ Copeland (but modified); perhaps that could be
> used - but Copeland is indecisive. One can add Smith compliance by
> checking for a CW among the first n ranked in the output, then n-1,
> then n-2 and so on, but that might also be too complex.
>
> Of course, if simplicity is paramount (i.e. we want very simple) we
> could just go with "break it by whoever beats the Plurality winner
> by the greatest amount" or plain old minmax (candidate with least
> worst defeat wins) or LR (greatest sum of victories wins).
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