[EM] Brian Olson's multiwinner IRNR idea seems busted

[Warren Smith]

> That actually raises another question. Since Range doesn't meet Majority
> ("pizza voting" example), how exactly is proportionality defined for a
> multiwinner version of Range?

--as follows (for RRV = "reweighted range voting").
The voters are assumed to have "colors."  The voting system has no
direct way to know about these colors. Red voters give all red
candidates max score and all others min score (and ditto for other
colors).  The proportionality theorem states that if voters behave
that way then the percentages of red, blue, etc winners are the same
(up to small precisely-boundable integer-roundoff effects) as the
proportions of voters with those colors.

--"Asset voting" also obeys a proportionality theorem.  See the
rangevoting.org pages
and or my papers at URLs below for more details.

--The prop. theorem obeyed by Hare/Droop STV involves colored voters
assumed to rank
all their-color candidates topmost and all others below (using rank
order ballots).

-- 
Warren D. Smith
http://RangeVoting.org  <-- add your endorsement (by clicking
"endorse" as 1st step)
and
math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html