[EM] Multipile Transferable Votes
Stephen H. Sosnick
shsosnick at ucdavis.edu
Wed Nov 18 11:07:36 PST 2009
>>>In a message about STV that appeared in
>>>Election-Methods Digest on 29-Aug-2009, I said
>>>the following: "1 vote [per ballot] is a
>>>special case. And, unfortunately, mentioning
>>>only that special case gives opponents of
>>>transferable-vote systems a politically
>>>effective counter-argument. Instead, what
>>>people favoring transferable-vote elections
>>>should say is that (1) every valid ballot will
>>>cast the same number of votes, and (2) the
>>>same outcome will emerge regardless of how
>>>many votes each valid ballot casts, whether
>>>that number is (a) 1 (which simplifies
>>>calculation), (b) the number of open seats
>>>(which might be, say, 3), or even (c) merely a
>>>letter, say, v."
>>>
>>>Two people posted comments.
>>>
>>>One wrote, "This statement is wrong . In
>>>STV-PR each voter has one vote and one vote
>>>only throughout the entire process. It is
>>>extremely important to refer to STV as the
>>>SINGLE Transferable Vote, because each voter
>>>must have only one vote to ensure PR. PR
>>>cannot be obtained (except by chance) if that
>>>single vote is not transferable ."
>>>
>>>The other comment was, "Ahh I see what you are
>>>aiming for. Effectively, each voter gets to
>>>submit v ranked ballots. This could make
>>>counting pretty hard."
>>>
>>>Both writers missed the point.
>>>
>>>On the other hand, our leading election
>>>theorist, that is, Nicolaus Tideman,
>>>understood. He saw that, as I had asserted,
>>>changing the number of votes cast by each
>>>ballot in a transferable-vote election might
>>>not affect the outcome of the election. And,
>>>remarkably, he tested and illustrated my
>>>assertion.
>>>
>>>To do so, Professor Tideman referred to a file
>>>he had containing 460 rankings actually
>>>submitted in a ranked-voting election with 4
>>>winners and 10 candidates. He selected three
>>>different numbers of votes that each ballot
>>>might have cast in that election, namely, 1
>>>(the number actually cast per ballot), 2, and
>>>4 (the number of seats being filled). For
>>>each of these three possibilities, he
>>>determined which candidates would have won the
>>>election.
>>>
>>>Professor Tideman used three different
>>>versions of STV. He used the two
>>>most-sophisticated versions currently
>>>available, namely, Meek's method and Warren's
>>>method, and also the Newland-Britton method.
>>>The latter is much advanced over early
>>>versions of STV (for example, over the
>>>primitive version still used in Massachusetts)
>>>but, like them, does not transfer a vote from
>>>a candidate being eliminated to the voter's
>>>next choice if that next choice was elected
>>>earlier in the calculations (as a result, that
>>>voter's following choice receives a larger
>>>transfer directly instead of a smaller
>>>transfer indirectly).
>>>
>>>Professor Tideman recently sent me his
>>>results, along with a copy of voters'
>>>rankings. Appendix 1, below, reproduces the
>>>calculations with Meek's method, and the
>>>results with Warren and Newland-Britton are
>>>available on request.
>>>
>>>To understand the calculations, you need to
>>>notice which variables changed and which
>>>variables did not change when the number of
>>>votes cast by each ballot changed.
>>>
>>>With each of the three versions of STV, three
>>>variables changed as the number of votes per
>>>ballot changed from 1 to 2 to 4. The
>>>variables that changed were the values at each
>>>stage of (a) the quota (that is, the number of
>>>votes that a candidate currently needs to be
>>>elected), (b) the candidates' tallies (that
>>>is, the number of votes that, after transfers
>>>of votes that occurred at previous stages,
>>>each candidate currently has), and (c) the
>>>"excess" (that is, the number of votes that,
>>>because some ballots have incomplete rankings,
>>>cannot be transferred from elected or
>>>eliminated candidates to active candidates).
>>>
>>>When the number of votes cast by each ballot
>>>changed, each of those three variables changed
>>>in proportion. Specifically, when each ballot
>>>cast 2 votes, the quota, the tallies, and the
>>>excess at every stage were 2 times the level
>>>they had when each ballot cast 1 vote.
>>>Similarly, when each ballot cast 4 votes, the
>>>values at every stage were 4 times the level
>>>that those variables had when each ballot cast
>>>1 vote.
>>>
>>>To see the re-scaling, compare three columns
>>>in Appendix 1, namely, (a) the third column
>>>from the left (that is, the column with the
>>>heading "1"), which contains the quota,
>>>tallies, and excess that emerged at each stage
>>>when each ballot cast one vote, (b) the fourth
>>>column from the left (that is, the column
>>>headed "2"), which contains the quota,
>>>tallies, and excess that emerged at each stage
>>>when each ballot cast 2 votes, and (c) the
>>>fifth column from the left (that is, the
>>>column headed "4"), which contains the quota,
>>>tallies, and excess that emerged at each stage
>>>when each ballot cast 4 votes.
>>>
>>>Equally important is what did NOT change as
>>>the number of votes cast by each ballot
>>>changed from 1 to 2 to 4. There was no change
>>>at any stage in the "retention proportion" of
>>>any candidate. (If a candidate's current tally
>>>exceeds the current quota, a
>>>portion--specifically, 1 minus the retention
>>>proportion--of each whole or fractional vote
>>>in that tally will transfer to the next choice
>>>on the ballot where that whole or fractional
>>>vote originated, provided that next-choice
>>>candidate is still "active").
>>>
>>>The retention proportions did not change
>>>because they were determined by the algorithm
>>>being used, that is, by Meek's, Warren's, or
>>>N-B's method. Hence, Appendix 1 shows the
>>>retention proportions, not in three columns,
>>>but rather in one, namely, the second column,
>>>which is headed "retain."
>>>
>>>Because changing the number of votes cast by
>>>each ballot caused a proportionate change in
>>>the quota, the tallies, and the excess at
>>>every stage, but did not change the retention
>>>proportion of any candidate at any stage, the
>>>outcome was--as predicted--the same whether a
>>>ballot cast 1, 2, or 4 votes. In particular,
>>>there was no change in (a) the candidates who
>>>won and who lost the election, (b) the number
>>>of stages (namely, nine) needed to determine
>>>which candidates won and lost, or (c) the
>>>stage at which each candidate was elected or
>>>eliminated. The column in Appendix 1 labeled
>>>"Status" shows the latter.
>>>
>>>On the other hand, because the three versions
>>>of STV use different retention proportions,
>>>they yield different outcomes. The winners
>>>are (a) candidates #10, #1, #7, and #2 with
>>>N-B, (b) #10, #1, #7, and #4 (instead of #2)
>>>with Meek, and (c) #10, #1, #7, and #6
>>>(instead of #2 or #4) with Warren (which
>>>Professor Tideman prefers). Starting in stage
>>>4, Meek's retention proportions differ from
>>>Warren's.
>>>
>>>A question probably has come to mind: If
>>>changing the number of votes cast by each
>>>ballot would not change the outcome, then why
>>>not continue to have each ballot cast one vote
>>>and continue to refer to SINGLE transferable
>>>vote? The answer is the second point made in
>>>my message of 29-Aug-2009, namely, that making
>>>each ballot cast as many votes as there are
>>>open seats would help win public support for a
>>>transferable-vote system.
>>>
>>>I say that after having a bad experience. My
>>>city, like many others, elects either 2 or 3
>>>members of a 5-member city council every 2
>>>years, using the multi-vote plurality system.
>>>With that system, a voter may vote for as many
>>>candidates are there are open seats, and the
>>>leading vote-getters win those seats.
>>>Recently, there was a popular vote on whether
>>>to substitute STV.
>>>
>>>STV lost, and I think a major reason was that,
>>>over and over, opponents asserted that
>>>introducing STV would deprive voters of their
>>>2nd and 3rd votes. Meanwhile, our side
>>>implicitly conceded that point whenever we
>>>mentioned SINGLE transferable vote or tried to
>>>explain how a single vote could support more
>>>than one candidate.
>>>
>>>Conversely, I do not see that anything would
>>>be lost by making a ranking ballot cast as
>>>many votes as there are openings. In
>>>particular:
>>>
>>>(1) As with 1 vote per ballot, every vote cast
>>>would automatically be apportioned among the
>>>candidates in a way that reflects both the
>>>voter's preferences and how others have voted.
>>>
>>>(2) As with 1 vote per ballot, voters would no
>>>longer need to choose between (a) helping
>>>their 1st choice beat their 2nd choice, and
>>>(b) helping their 2nd choice beat candidates
>>>liked even less (of the ballots submitted in
>>>my city's last seven 2-seat elections, 29%
>>>cast only one vote, thereby giving priority to
>>>helping the 1st choice).
>>>
>>>(3) As with 1 vote per ballot, whether
>>>spoilers are nominated would become less
>>>important.
>>>
>>>(4) As with 1 vote per ballot, the proportion
>>>of open seats filled by a faction's favorite
>>>candidates would, at times, become more like
>>>the proportion of votes cast by that faction.
>>>
>>>Moreover, with multiple transferable votes, it
>>>probably would be easier for the public to
>>>understand and appreciate these advantages.
>>>
>>>Stressing benefit (4), some advocates of STV
>>>call the system "proportional representation,"
>>>not STV. For them, especially, it should be
>>>interesting to compare the STV outcomes
>>>described above with the outcome that
>>>multi-vote plurality would have produced in
>>>the same election.
>>>
>>>If multi-vote plurality had been used in that
>>>election, then (a) each voter would have been
>>>invited to vote for up to 4 candidates, (b) a
>>>candidate would have received one vote for
>>>each voter who had voted for that candidate,
>>>and (c) the winners would have been the 4
>>>candidates receiving the most votes.
>>>
>>>How the 460 voters would have voted is not
>>>obvious. Because of the dilemma mentioned
>>>above (see benefit (2)), a voter might have
>>>voted for 4 candidates or for 3, 2, or 1.
>>>Accordingly, I learned which candidates would
>>>have won if every voter voted only for his or
>>>her (a) 1st choice, (b) 1st and 2nd choices,
>>>(c) top 3 choices, and (d) top 4 choices.
>>>Appendix 2 contains the figures.
>>>
>>>In all four cases, the outcome with multi-vote
>>>plurality was, to my surprise, reasonable and,
>>>indeed, arguably better than with N-B.
>>>Specifically, the winners in cases (a), (b),
>>>and (c) were, as with Meek's method,
>>>candidates #1, #4, #7, and #10 and, in case
>>>(d), were the same as with Warren's method,
>>>that is, #1, #6, #7, and #10. Hence, changing
>>>from multi-vote plurality to STV--at least to
>>>either of those versions of STV--would not
>>>have made the proportion of open seats filled
>>>by a faction's favorite candidates more like
>>>the proportion of votes cast by that faction.
>>>
>>>On the other hand, factions were either absent
>>>or invisible. While 4 seats were open, STV
>>>elected only 1 candidate, namely, #10, before
>>>votes were transferred from an eliminated
>>>candidate. The next-most-frequent 1st choice,
>>>namely, candidate #1, was top-ranked by merely
>>>81 of the 460 voters, and surplus transferred
>>>from #10 was not large enough to carry #1 (or
>>>any other candidate) over the threshold. As a
>>>result, no outcome could have made the
>>>proportion of open seats filled by factions'
>>>favorite candidates resemble the proportion of
>>>votes cast by those factions.
>>>
>>>But there are cases, at least hypothetical
>>>cases, where STV probably would--and
>>>multi-vote plurality probably would
>>>not--produce proportional representation, in
>>>the sense that STV would make the proportion
>>>of open seats filled by each faction's
>>>favorite candidates as close to the proportion
>>>of votes cast by the faction as is possible
>>>when the proportion of open seats filled by a
>>>faction's favorites must be a multiple of
>>>(1/number of open seats).
>>>
>>>For example, suppose that (a) 2 seats are
>>>open, (b) 6 candidates, namely, A, B, C, D, E,
>>>and F, are running; (c) 100 people vote; (d)
>>>35 voters rank the candidates A > B > C > D >
>>>E > F, 34 voters think C > D > E > F > B > A,
>>>and 31 voters think F > E > D > C > B > A; (e)
>>>with multi-vote plurality, voters will vote
>>>for both their 1st choice and their 2nd
>>>choice; and (f) with a transferable-vote
>>>system, voters will report both their 1st
>>>choice and their 2nd choice.
>>>
>>>With multi-vote plurality, candidates (A, B,
>>>C, D, E, F) would receive, respectively, (35,
>>>35, 34, 34, 31, 31) votes. Hence, candidates
>>>A and B would win. As a result, candidates
>>>favored by merely 35% of the voters (and
>>>disfavored by the other 65%) would fill 100%
>>>of the open seats.
>>>
>>>With a transferable-vote system, in contrast,
>>>candidate A and candidate C would immediately
>>>receive more than fraction 1/(2+1) of the
>>>votes cast and therefore (in that order) would
>>>quickly be elected. As a result, a candidate
>>>who is the 1st choice of 35% of the voters
>>>would fill 50% of the open seats, and a
>>>candidate who is the 1st choice of 34% of the
>>>voters would fill the other 50%.
>>>Proportionality!
>>>
>>>I conclude that (a) a transferable-vote system
>>>will produce the same outcome regardless of
>>>the number of votes cast by each ballot; (b)
>>>to win greater public support for a
>>>transferable-vote system, each ballot should
>>>cast as many votes as there are open
>>>positions; (c) when the electorate is not
>>>polarized, multi-vote plurality may produce
>>>the same outcome as a transferable-vote
>>>system; and (d) even when a transferable-vote
>>>system does not increase proportionality, it
>>>will have other benefits.
>>>
>>>
>>>APPENDIX 1:
>>>OUTCOME WITH MEEK'S METHOD
>>>
>>>Votes per ballot= 1 2 4
>>>
>>>Stage 1 Quota= 92 184 368
>>>Cand. Retain Tally Tally Tally Status
>>>#1 1.000 81 162 324
>>>#2 1.000 40 80 160
>>>#3 1.000 15 30 50
>>>#4 1.000 42 84 168
>>>#5 1.000 27 54 108
>>>#6 1.000 41 82 164
>>>#7 1.000 70 140 280
>>>#8 1.000 12 24 48
>>>#9 1.000 14 28 56
>>>#10 1.000 118 236 472 Newly elected
>>> Subtotal= 460 920 1830
>>> Excess= 0 0 0
>>> Total= 460 920 1830
>>>
>>>Stage 2 Quota= 91.87 183.73 367.5
>>>Cand. Retain Tally Tally Tally Status
>>>#1 1.000 88.53 177.06 354.1
>>>#2 1.000 41.55 83.10 166.2
>>>#3 1.000 15.89 31.77 63.5
>>>#4 1.000 43.77 87.54 175.1
>>>#5 1.000 28.77 57.54 115.1
>>>#6 1.000 43.21 86.43 172.9
>>>#7 1.000 73.10 146.20 292.4
>>>#8 1.000 15.54 31.09 62.2 To be excluded
>>>#9 1.000 17.10 34.20 68.4
>>>#10 0.779 91.87 183.73 367.5 Elected
>>> Subtotal= 459.33 918.66 1837.4
>>> Excess= 0.66 1.33 2.7
>>> Total= 460.00 920.00 1840.0
>>>
>>>Stage 3 Quota= 91.84 183.69 367.4
>>>Cand. Retain Tally Tally Tally Status
>>>#1 1.000 93.63 187.26 374.5 Newly elected
>>>#2 1.000 42.59 85.19 170.4
>>>#3 1.000 18.30 36.59 73.2
>>>#4 1.000 44.59 89.19 178.4
>>>#5 1.000 31.37 62.74 125.5
>>>#6 1.000 44.11 88.22 176.4
>>>#7 1.000 74.89 149.78 299.6
>>>#8 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#9 1.000 17.89 35.78 71.6
>>>#10 0.741 91.84 183.69 367.4 Elected
>>> Subtotal= 459.21 918.44 1837.0
>>> Excess= 0.78 1.56 3.1
>>> Total= 460.00 920.00 1840.0
>>>
>>>Stage 4 Quota= 91.84 183.68 367.4
>>>Cand. Retain Tally Tally Tally Status
>>>#1 0.980 91.84 183.68 367.4 Elected
>>>#2 1.000 42.95 85.89 171.8
>>>#3 1.000 18.52 37.04 74.1
>>>#4 1.000 44.94 89.89 179.8
>>>#5 1.000 31.51 63.02 126.0
>>>#6 1.000 44.48 88.98 177.9
>>>#7 1.000 75.15 150.29 300.6
>>>#8 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#9 1.000 17.97 35.95 71.9 To be excluded
>>>#10 0.738 91.84 183.68 367.4 Elected
>>> Subtotal= 459.20 918.42 1836.9
>>> Excess= 0.80 1.59 3.2
>>> Total= 460.00 920.00 1840.0
>>>
>>>Stage 5 Quota= 91.83 183.66 367.3
>>>Cand. Retain Tally Tally Tally Status
>>>#1 0.952 91.83 183.66 367.3 Elected
>>>#2 1.000 44.62 89.24 178.5
>>>#3 1.000 21.16 42.32 84.6 To be excluded
>>>#4 1.000 47.12 94.23 188.5
>>>#5 1.000 34.92 69.84 139.7
>>>#6 1.000 48.37 96.74 193.5
>>>#7 1.000 79.30 158.59 317.2
>>>#8 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#9 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#10 0.723 91.83 183.66 367.3 Elected
>>> Subtotal= 459.15 918.28 1836.6
>>> Excess= 0.86 1.72 3.4
>>> Total= 460.00 920.00 1840.0
>>>
>>>Stage 6 Quota= 91.77 183.54 367.1
>>>Cand. Retain Tally Tally Tally Status
>>>#1 0.899 91.77 183.54 367.1 Elected
>>>#2 1.000 50.27 100.54 201.1
>>>#3 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#4 1.000 51.78 103.56 207.1
>>>#5 1.000 38.95 77.91 155.8 To be excluded
>>>#6 1.000 49.81 99.63 199.3
>>>#7 1.000 84.49 168.93 338.0
>>>#8 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#9 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#10 0.699 91.77 183.54 367.1 Elected
>>> Subtotal= 458.84 917.65 1835.5
>>> Excess= 1.15 2.31 4.6
>>> Total= 460.00 920.00 1840.0
>>>
>>>Stage 7 Quota= 91.04 182.08 364.2
>>>Cand. Retain Tally Tally Tally Status
>>>#1 0.804 91.04 182.08 364.2 Elected
>>>#2 1.000 57.68 115.36 230.7
>>>#3 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#4 1.000 59.62 119.23 238.5
>>>#5 0 0.00 0.00 0.0 Excluded
>>>#6 1.000 58.93 117.86 235.7
>>>#7 1.000 96.90 193.79 387.6 Newly elected
>>>#8 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#9 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#10 0.644 91.04 182.08 364.2 Elected
>>> Subtotal= 455.21 910.40 1820.9
>>> Excess= 4.79 9.59 19.2
>>> Total= 460.00 920.00 1840.0
>>>
>>>Stage 8 Quota= 90.85 181.70 363.4
>>>Cand. Retain Tally Tally Tally Status
>>>#1 0.791 90.85 181.70 363.4 Elected
>>>#2 1.000 59.02 118.04 236.1 To be excluded
>>>#3 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#4 1.000 61.92 123.84 247.7
>>>#5 0 0.00 0.00 0.0 Excluded
>>>#6 1.000 60.76 121.51 243.0
>>>#7 0.932 90.85 181.70 363.4 Elected
>>>#8 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#9 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#10 0.635 90.85 181.70 363.4 Elected
>>> Subtotal= 454.25 908.49 1817.0
>>> Excess= 5.76 11.52 23.0
>>> Total= 460.00 920.00 1840.0
>>>
>>>Stage 9 Quota= 87.86 175.71 351.4
>>>Cand. Retain Tally Tally Tally Status
>>>#1 0.625 87.86 175.71 351.4 Elected
>>>#2 0 0.00 0.00 0.0 Excluded
>>>#3 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#4 1.000 88.33 176.67 353.3 Newly elected
>>>#5 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#6 1.000 87.38 174.76 349.5 To be excluded
>>>#7 0.726 87.86 175.71 351.4 Elected
>>>#8 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#9 0 0 0 0 Excluded
>>>#10 0.520 87.86 175.71 351.4 Elected
>>> Subtotal= 439.29 878.56 1757.0
>>> Excess= 20.72 41.43 82.9
>>> Total= 460.00 920.00 1840.0
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>APPPENDIX 2
>>>OUTCOME WITH MULTI-VOTE PLURALITY
>>>
>>>Column (1) shows votes received if voters vote only for their 1st choice.
>>>Column (2) shows votes received if voters vote
>>>only for their 1st and 2nd choices.
>>>Column (3) shows votes received if voters vote only for their top 3 choices.
>>>Column (4) shows votes received if voters vote only for their top 4 choices.
>>>
>>>Cand. (1) (2) (3) (4)
>>>#10 118 192 239 289
>>>#1 81 163 215 260
>>>#7 70 126 174 214
>>>#4 42 89 133 166
>>>#6 41 86 129 171
>>>#2 40 68 114 159
>>>#5 27 65 111 146
>>>#8 12 42 79 114
>>>#9 14 37 71 113
>>>#3 15 41 74 102
>>>Total 460 909 1,339 1,734
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