[EM] Cramster question

Michael Rouse mrouse1 at mrouse.com
Thu May 14 16:41:28 PDT 2009


Warren has done a lot of research into Range voting. I wonder how well 
RV works as a Condorcet completion method.

Actually, I was on his site the other day 
(http://www.rangevoting.org/MedianVrange.html), looking at the 
Balinski-Laraki median range voting method. It made me wonder what the 
results would be if you took the combined score (or the average) of all 
range votes above the median  for every candidate. It looks like it 
should satisfy the majority criterion, assuming people have a single top 
preference (ties at the top score would complicate that a bit).

I was at work, though, so I didn't play with the numbers, though if 
someone has done that, it would be interesting to see. It probably is on 
the range voting site, though I didn't see it.

Michael Rouse

Paul Kislanko wrote:
> I personally like the idea of using Bucklin to break a Condorcet cycle.
> Suppose alternatives Ax, Ay, and Az prevent there being a Condorcet winner.
> Then find the best ranks Rx, Ry, Rz for which a majority of the voters rank
> Ax, Ay, Az AT LEAST Rx,y,z respectively. If one of Rx, Ry, Rz is better than
> the others, that determines the winner. If Rx=Ry=Rz (or the two best are
> equal) then use the size of the respective majority (i.e. if 100 voters and
> 52 give Rx but 51 give Ry then Ax wins the tie with Ay.)
>
> If both the R and #votes providing the majority that determines R are the
> same we have a true tie. Either flip a coin or have a runoff.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
> [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Terry
> Bouricius
> Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2009 2:48 PM
> To: Warren Smith; election-methods
> Subject: Re: [EM] Cramster question
>
> Warren,
>
> However, using first-choice plurality to settle Condorcet cycles could 
> easily elect the Condorcet-loser (the candidate who loses in every 
> pairwise match-up). There are many far superior cycle breakers. I 
> personally favor ranked-pairs because it is both reasonable, and 
> relatively easy to explain to lay people (unlike many cycle breakers).
>
> Terry Bouricius
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>   




More information about the Election-Methods mailing list