[EM] PR-STV with approval based elimination
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-elmet at broadpark.no
Sun May 3 02:47:08 PDT 2009
Dan Bishop wrote:
> You could use Plurality (with vote-splitting between equally ranked
> candidates) to determine surpluses and a different method to determine
> eliminations. For example,
[snip]
> So the winning set is {Andre, Escher, Gore}. Coincidentally, the same
> as the CPO-STV result.
Yes, you could do that. However, this leads to a great incentive to rank
the candidate you preferred second, with some nonsense candidate in
first place. The can't-win candidate shields you from being
downweighted. For instance:
DQ/2 + 1: X1 > A > B > C > ...
DQ/2 + 1: X2 > A > B > C > ...
(...)
If A, B, or C wins, then these two blocks (a Droop quota plus two worth)
contributed to the winning candidate's victory, yet they're not
downweighted.
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