[EM] Strategic voting in Condorcet & Range N-canddt elections - boiled down (& Ketchum reply)

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

Warren Smith wrote:
> REMARK 1:
> Range is known to be better than every rank-order ballot voting system
> for honest voters under the "RNEM" probability model, where "better"
> is measured by Bayesian Regret.  This proven by WD Smith in recent
> papers for each N=3,4,5,...,31.
> Permitting rank-order ballots to include equalities has no effect on
> this because in the RNEM exactly-equal utilities occur with
> probability=0, hence honest rank-order
> voters would not use them.
>
> So in these senses, range is better for both honest & strategic voters
> than every
> rank-order method meeting the criteria in the theorem, measured by
> Bayesian Regret.

In the BR sense, what's the best voting system that meets the criteria 
you listed? Range fails in the same way as Borda - someone who's ranked 
top by a majority may still not be elected. If we consider Approval 
votes complete (i.e. that approving A and B and not approving C means 
the voter truly can't decide which is better of A and B), then I suppose 
Approval would win this one. Otherwise, which method? It would have to 
be a ranked or rated method.