[EM] voting strategy with rank-order-with-equality ballots

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Chris,

--- En date de : Mar 9.6.09, Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> a écrit :
> Kevin,
>  
> "I have found that Schulze(wv) had little
> favorite betrayal incentive. In simulations I mentioned in
> June 05, out of 50,000 trials, Schulze(wv) showed incentive
> 7 times, compared to 251 for Schulze(margins), 363 for
> Condorcet//Approval, and 625 for my erroneous interpretation
> of ERBucklin(whole)."
>  
> What was this "erroneous
> interpretation"?

That if you vote A=B>C, votes for C are added in the second round. This
also makes it non-monotonic.

> How can a method that meets
> Favourite Betrayal, such as ER-Bucklin(whole) ever show
> "favourite
> betrayal incentive"?

By interpreting it erroneously.

Kevin